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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECHCENSORSHIP OF MOVIE WHICH PRESENTS IMMORALITY
AS A PROPER PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR
Petitioner, a motion picture distributor, was refused a license for
the film "Lady Chatterley's Lover" on the ground that its theme was
immoral within the meaning of New York's motion picture licensing
statute.1 In affirming the ruling of the licensing authority, the New
York Court of Appeals held that, since the harmful effect of motion
pictures which convey immoral ideas outweighs any positive merit
they may have, such films are not within the guarantee of freedom of
speech and may be subjected to prior restraint.2 The court further
held that the factors of vividness and mass appeal justified censorship of movies through a licensing system even though this means
of restraint might not be valid in other areas of communication. On
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed.
A statutory provision which authorizes censorship of motion pictures
because they present immorality as a proper pattern of behavior
constitutes a restraint on the free advocacy of ideas and is unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth amendments. Kingsley Int'l
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
1. The statute provides that "it shall be unlawful to exhibit, or to sell,

lease or lend for exhibition ... any motion picture film ... unless there is at
the time in full force and effect a valid license or permit therefor of the
education department ..... " N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 129. A license may not be
withheld "unless such film is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt
morals or incite to crime .... ." N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 122. A film is immoral
within the statutory definition when its "dominant purpose or effect .

.

. is

erotic or pornographic;" or when it "portrays acts of sexual immorality,
perversion, or lewdness, or it... expressly or impliedly presents such acts as
desirable, acceptable or proper standards of behavior." N. Y. EDUc. LAW § 122a.
Petitioner was refused a license because the Motion Picture Division of the
New York Department of Education found that the film contained certain
scenes which were immoral within the meaning of the statute. The board
of regents upheld this refusal, but it did so on the broader ground that the
entire theme of the picture was objectionable for the reason that it presented
adultery "as a desirable, acceptable, and proper pattern of behavior." This
determination was annulled by the supreme court, appellate division, which
held the term "immoral" void for vagueness in spite of the extended definition
given it in the statute. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of
New York, 4 App. Div. 2d 348, 165 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1957).
2. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York, 4 N.Y.2d
349, 151 N.E.2d 197, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1958). The court based its holding
largely on the reasoning in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), which
held that obscene utterances were not "speech" within the meaning of the

first amendment. The New York court held that the effect of movies which
attractively present immoral ideas is identical to the effect produced by
obscenity and that, therefore, the former should be excluded from first
amendment protection along with the latter.
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The constitutional boundaries of motion picture censorship are
vaguely defined, not only because of the uncertainty which surrounds
the question of prior restraints in general, but also because the constitutional status of motion pictures in relation to other forms of
communication has never been definitely established. Motion pictures
have only recently been included within the category of constitutionally protected speech, 3 and it is not yet clear whether their special
"capacity for evil" will be held to justify a greater measure of control-either as to form or substance-than is imposed in other areas
of communication. In these other areas the prohibition against prior
restraint is nearly absolute, 4 the significant exceptions being the application of the doctrine of "clear and present danger"5 and the
restraint of obscenity.6 It has been contended that the unique vivid3. The Supreme Court of the United States originally held that movies were

primarily a business enterprise, that they did not constitute a significant
organ of public opinion, and that, therefore, they were not entitled to any
protection under the first amendment. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). Thirty-three years later, in United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), the Court indicated by way
of dictum that the Mutual holding would no longer be followed, although it
was subsequently invoked by a federal court. RD-DR Corp. v. Smith, 183
F.2d 562 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950). Motion picture communication was finally held to constitute "speech" in Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952).
4. E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (speech); Near v. Minnesota
ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (newspapers). The practice of declaring
legislation invalid simply because it is deemed to impose a prior restraint has
received much criticism. "The generalization that prior restraint is particularly obnoxious in civil liberties cases must yield to a more particularistic
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Code, is "an exacerbated, morbid, or perverted" interest in sex. MoDEL
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ness of motion picture communication warrants the imposition of
restraints beyond the narrow limits of these exceptions, 7 but the
Supreme Court has so far reserved decision on the matter.8 The
Court has also failed to indicate which forms of restraint are permissible in cases where some restraint is justified from a substantive
standpoint. 9 Advocates of motion picture censorship have contended
that licensing systems, while probably invalid as applied to publications, are justified in the case of movies because of the greater
rapidity with which they reach greater masses of people. It has been
said that since a movie may affect many people before injunctive
relief is obtained, prior licensing is the only adequate means of
protecting public morality.10 Much of the uncertainty in this area is
attributable to the Supreme Court's practice of deciding censorship
cases by means of uninformative per curiam decisions." Some of these
decisions cite only Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, a rather ambiguous opinion
in which it is not entirely clear whether the statute is held invalid
for vagueness, or because of improper substantive content.' 2 FurtherPENAL CODE § 207.10, comment at 29 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957). Although

the principal application of obscenity and "clear and present danger" has
been in the field of criminal prosecution, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized, from the moment it established the general prohibition
against prior restraints, that obscenity and incitement to crime constitute
valid exceptions to that prohibition. Near v. MVinnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S.
697, 716 (1931) (dictum). Recently, the Court invoked the obscenity exception
as the basis for holding valid an injunction against the sale of a certain
book. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). For discussions
of these exceptions in relation to censorship, see Desmond, Legal Problems
Involved in Censoring Media of Mass Communication, 40 MARQ. L. REV. 38
(1956); Comment, 59 COLuM. L. REv. 337 (1959); Note, The Supreme Court
and Obscenity, 11 VAND. L. REv. 585 (1958); Note, Entertainment: Public
Pressures and the Law, 71 HAv. L. REv. 326 (1957).
7. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96 (1949) (concurring opinion by Frankfurter, J.) (semble); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New
York, 4 N.Y.2d 349, 364, 151 N.E.2d 197, 205, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39, 51 (1958).
8. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York, 360 U.S.
684, 689-90 (1959); Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) ("capacity
for evil may be relevant in determining the permissible scope of community
control"; but held sacrilegious films not subject to control.)
9. Ibid. It is assumed that the term "prior restraint" applies to both
licensing systems and injunctive relief. But see Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 442 (1957).
10. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York, 4 N.Y.2d
349, 151 N.E.2d 197, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1958). Apparently licensing would not
be valid in other areas of communication. "Where ordinances order the censorship of speech or religious practices before permitting their exercise, the
Constitution forbids their enforcement." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 82
(1949). See also Superior Films, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 346 U.S. 587
(1954) (concurring opinion by Douglas, J.); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945). The relative merits of the various methods of controlling motion
picture content are discussed in Note, Entertainment: Public Pressures and
the Law, 71 HARv. L. Rav. 326, 340 (1957).
11. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957) (per curiam);
Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955) (per curiam);
Superior Films, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (per curiam);
Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) (per curiam). For a criticism of this
practice, see Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice: a Critique, 69 HAuv.
L. REv. 707, 719-21 (1956).
12. 343 U.S. 495 (1952). Much of the opinion discusses substance: "the
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more, the decisions do not indicate whether the statutes themselves
are being rejected or whether they are simply being held inapplicable
to the films in question. As a result, some courts have been led to
assume that licensing statutes may be valid if carefully worded and
restricted to proper objects of prior restraint; 13 other courts have concluded that no effective censorship will be permitted. 14
The majority opinion reduces the constitutional issue in the instant
case to very simple terms by the interpretation which it gives to the
15
court of appeals' construction of the New York licensing statute.
The court of appeals' decision is interpreted as holding "Lady Chatterley's Lover" immoral within the statutory definition, not because it
is obscene or because it incites viewers to criminal action, but because it presents an idea-adultery--"as being right and desirable
for certain people under certain circumstances."' 16 The Court concludes that, since the Burstyfn case has already established the right
of motion pictures to some protection under the first amendment, and
since "the First Amendment's basic' 7 guarantee is of freedom to
advocate ideas,"' 8 the censorship in the instant case is invalid on the
basis of Burstyn alone. Thus, it was unnecessary to determine whether
motion pictures warrant a broader substantive basis for control than
other media, and also unnecessary to determine whether licensing
statutes are invalid per se.
Although the Supreme Court has once again reserved formal decision on the vital issues of motion picture censorship, it has, in spite
of itself, conveyed a fairly definite outline of the limits beyond which
state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views

distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the
expression of those views," 343 U.S. at 505, but most courts have interpreted
the decision as holding the term "sacrilegious" void for vagueness. See
cases cited in Note, 37 TExAs L. Rav. 339, n. 20 (1959).
13. E.g., Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 172 F. Supp.
69 (1959); American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 334,
121 N.E.2d 585 (1954).
14. E.g., Capitol Enterprises v. Regents, 1 App. Div. 2d 990, 149 N.Y.2d
920 (1956); Hallmark Productions, Inc. v. Carroll, 384 Pa. 348, 121 A.2d 584
(1956).
15. All members of the Court were agreed that their decision must rest
on the interpretation given the statute by the state court.
16. In concurring opinions Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan
contended that the statute was valid, but improperly applied. Both felt that
the majority had erroneously interpreted the phrase "the presentation of
adultery as right and desirable" to mean that abstract discussions of the
desirability of adultery were prohibited. Mr. Justice Harlan contended that
the lower court decision was based on both obscenity and incitement to
crime; what was proscribed was "the corruption of publi& morals, occasioned by the inciting effect of a particular [obscene] portrayal." 360 U.S.
at 706. Mr. Justice Frankfurter felt that the statute was intended to advance
a legitimate state interest in protecting public morality and criticized the
majority for attempting to escape the burden of making case-by-case judgments as to the validity of individual applications of such a statute. The
position of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas was simply that censorship on any basis is untenable.
17. Italics added.
18. 360 U.S. at 688.
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such censorship may not go. The majority opinion implies that licensing statutes, if valid at all, are so only to the extent that they are
directed toward the elimination of obscenity and incitement to
crime.19 This impression is reenforced by the fact that New York's
statutory provision is held invalid under the construction given it by
the court of appeals, in spite of that court's extended discussion of the
similarity between the interests protected by this provision and those
protected by obscenity and "clear and present danger" provisions.20
It is difficult to conceive of a ground for censorship broader than that
imposed by these latter standards, and yet narrower than that imposed by the construction here held invalid. It is submitted that none
exists. The Court was almost certainly justified in rejecting the
censorship provision applied by the court of appeals. It is assumed
that the basic issue in censorship cases should always be whether
the individual interest in freedom of speech is outweighed by some
greater public interest.2 1 On this basis, movies which merely make
immorality attractive should probably not be subjected to censorship even though it is conceded that the state has an interest in
preventing the general deterioration of public morality.2 2 The causal
relationship between such movies and an immoral social climate has
probably not been demonstrated with sufficient certainty23 to' establish a public interest in their suppression adequate to overcome
the individual interest in expressing whatever ideas they may contain.
Censorship of obscene films or films which incite illegal conduct is
somewhat easier to support. Where movies are obscene, and therefore have no appreciable positive content m it is arguable that the
19. Although the opinion makes no definite statement to this effect, much
of its discussion is directed toward distinguishing "the presentation of
adultery as right and desirable" from obscenity and incitement to crime.
Thus, the impression is conveyed that the latter standards represent the
maximum control which could be imposed. Mr. Justice Harlan explicitly
states that this is his view: "advocacy of adultery, unaccompanied by obscene
portrayal or actual incitement to such behavior, may not constitutionally be
proscribed by the State

....

"

360 U.S. at 705 (concurring opinion).

20. See note 2 supra.
21. Cf. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 622 (1954); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 644-45 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949).
22. In support of the proposition that moral deterioration is a proper
matter for state action, see Desmond, Legal Problems Involved in Censoring
Media of Mass Communication,40 MARQ. L. REV. 38, 42-3 (1956).

23. Authorities have been unable to agree as to whether obscenity is causally related to immoral action. Note, 71 HARv. L. Ruv. 326, 349 (1957). The
framers of the Model Penal Code are not satisfied that such a relationship
exists. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, comment at 28 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1957). If the relationship is unclear with regard to obscenity, it must be
at least equally so with regard to material which merely make immorality
attractive. See Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 LAw &
CONTEMP.

PROB.

587, 593-96

(1955).

But see Katzev v.

County of Los

Angeles, 336 P.2d 6 (Calif. 1959), wherein the court in a very thorough and
persuasive opinion holds that crime comic books are a clear cause of
juvenile delinquency.
24. "9But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of
obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance." Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 464 (1957).
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individual interest is so small as to be outweighed by the public
interest, however vaguely defined. Where movies incite imminent
criminal action, the public interest is definite and may be sufficiently
great to prevail. However, this line of reasoning assumes that censors
will apply the statutory criteria with some degree of accuracy. In
the light of practical experience, it is as least as reasonable to assume
that censors will tend to restrain films which offend their personal
moral codes, regardless of whether obscenity or incitement to crime
is technically present2 5 If so, carefully worded statutory provisions
will become mere vehicles for the imposition of the moral judgments
of a few men upon the rest of society. At any rate, it is clear that the
decision in the instant case is directed toward that which cannot be
done in the way of censorship, rather than with that which can be
done. The opinion does not state that censorship would be valid if
confined to obscenity and incitement to crime-it merely implies that
it is invalid if not so confined. Thus, this decision seems to leave state
legislatures with two narrow2 standards for censorship, and no assurance that even these may validly be invoked.27
25. "Mr. Binford barred from Memphis showings of pictures starring
Charles Chaplin and Ingrid Bergman because of personal distaste for their
morals; he refused to pass any films showing train robberies, apparently
During
because he was himself robbed while on a train in his youth ....
the trial of the Times Film case . . . the censor was presented with a

definition of obscenity which was the same as that given by the state supreme
court. Despite the fact that she was supposed to follow this definition, the
censor stated that she did not consider it adequate, apparently having never
heard the court's definition before." Note, 71 HARv. L. REv. 326, 338 nn. 87
88 (1957). One authority, after an exhaustive enumeration of literary and
scientific works which have been censored as "obscene," concludes that "[I]t
is inevitable, given a system of censorship, that the censor himself apply the
criterion of censorship, whatever that criterion may be; and it comes close to
the nature of bureaucracy, if not the nature of man, to expand jurisdictional
criteria and thus jurisdiction and power. Censors cannot easily be controlled
....
[J]udicial review comes only after the fact." de Grazia, Obscenity and
the Mail: a Study of Administrative Restraint, 20 LAW AND

CONTEMP.

PROB.

608, 616 (1955).
26. These standards do not seem to have the same relevance to motion
pictures produced for public consumption as they have in other forms and
levels of communication. Movies submitted for licensing will seldom be so
devoid of content as to descend to the level of the obscene. See notes 6 and

24 supra. As to incitement, the majority in the instant case shows an inclination to apply the "clear and present danger" test to motion pictures,
rather than the "grave and probable" test discussed in note 5 supra: "Advocacy of conduct proscribed by law is not . . . 'a justification for denying

free speech where advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing
to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on.' 360 U.S. at
689, quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (concurring
opinion) (emphasis added). It seems doubtful whether any commercially
produced pictures could be found which would come within such a proscription. A possible exception is the danger of public riot resulting from the
exhibition of "rock and roll" and other highly stimulating types of movies.
But see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697, 722 (1931), indicating
that the danger of civil riot is not a justification for the prior restraint of
newspapers.
27. At present, only Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan have
definitely committed themselves in favor of motion picture censorship. On
the other hand, only Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas have un-
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRE-EMPTION-FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 DOES NOT
INVALIDATE STATE WIRETAPPING STATUTE
An attorney was convicted of eleven counts of wilfully aiding and
employing others to wire tap in violation of the New York Penal Law.'
The trial court excluded "malice" as an element of "wilfulness" in
its jury charge. Upon appeal, defendant contended that in excluding
malice the court had construed the statute as a protection against
invasions of privacy instead of a malicious mischief statute intended
to protect property. Therefore, defendant insisted the statute was
pre-empted by the enactment of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934,2 a primary purpose of which was to protect
against invasions of privacy.3 Defendant therefore concluded that
the statute was contrary to the supremacy clause4 of the federal
constitution. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York, held,
affirmed. Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 does
not pre-empt state laws which make wire tapping a criminal offense.
People v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 500, 158 N.E.2d 817, 186 N.Y.S.2d 230,
appeal dismissed, 80 Sup. Ct. 57 (1959).
Federal pre-emption or "occupation of the field" is a unique concept
engendered by the federal form of government. Developed primarily
for the commerce clause,5 the Supreme Court has relied upon it also
6
to invalidate state legislation in the areas of sedition and interqualifiedly opposed it. However, there is strong reason to believe that Mr.
Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan are in accord with this latter
position. See their dissenting opinions in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354
U.S. 436 (1957).
1. The statute renders guilty of a felony any person who
"shall unlawfully and wilfully cut, break, tap, or make connection with
any telegraph or telephone line, wire, cable or instrument. . . or who
shall aid, agree with, employ or conspire with any person or persons
to unlawfully do, or permit or cause to be done, any of the acts hereinbefore mentioned, or who shall occupy, use a line, or shall knowingly
permit another to occupy, use a line, a room, table, establishment or
apparatus to unlawfully do or cause to be done any of the acts hereinbefore mentioned.... "N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1423 (6).
2. "[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person...." 48 Stat. 1103 (1934) ; 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952).
3. United States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
4. "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoNsT. art.
VI, para. 2.
5. The court has acted to prevent partitioning of the United States by
locally erected trade barriers in many cases. E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See also Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 513
(1956).
6. 350 U.S. 497, 509 (1956). The Smith Act of 1940, as amended in 1948, 18
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national relations.7 Where the constitutional grant of power to Congress is not exclusive and where the state action is based on traditional
police powers, the Court has been more reluctant to apply the exclusion doctrine.8 And where Congress by its acts occupies only a
portion of a field9 in which the states have concurrent powers, the
congressional action will not be implied to supersede state action
on matters not covered by the federal legislation unless a conflict
exists. 0 Of course, Congress by express provision may permit state
action in a field." Absent explicit pre-emption of state law, congressional intent to "occupy the field" to the exclusion of state law must
be otherwise clearly manifested. 12 The Supreme Court, in determining
whether Congress intended to pre-empt a field, has established three
criteria: pervasiveness of federal regulation, dominance of federal
interest, and potential state-federal administrative conflict.13 If any
of the three exist federal pre-emption has occurred and federal law
supersedes state law even though the state statute merely supplements
rather than conflicts with the federal law.' 4
The instant case represents the initial decision on the question of
federal pre-emption of state wire tapping statutes. The court was
faced with two important questions: Whether the state penal proU.S.C. § 2385 (1958), was held to pre-empt a similar Pennsylvania statute

making sedition against the United States a crime.
7. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). The Court held a Pennsylvania
statute which increased registration requirements for aliens was pre-empted
by federal statute, the regulation of aliens being in the area of international
relations and therefore an area of exclusive national concern.
8. UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956)
(violence); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) (highway regulation);
Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S.
740 (1942); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) (health); Reid v. Colorado,
187 U.S. 137 (1902) (health).
9. Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937). See also Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); South Carolina Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441
(1937).
10. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 283 U.S. 380 (1931).
11. Justice Burton, in his dissenting opinion in California v. Zook, 336 U.S.
725, 753 (1949) stated: "Where there is legislative intent to share the exclusiveness of the congressional jurisdiction, appropriate language can make
that intent clear." See U.S. CONST., amend. XVIII, § 2: "The Congress and
the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."
12. UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 275 (1956);
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949); Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v.
Bell, 296 N.Y. 15, 68 N.E.2d 854 (1946); People v. Fury, 279 N.Y. 433, 18
N.E.2d 650 (1939); People v. Welch, 141 N.Y. 266, 36 N.E. 328 (1894).
13. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956).
14. "When Congress has taken the particular subject matter in hand
coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be declared
a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go."
Mr. Justice Holmes in Charleston & W. C. Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237
U.S. 597, 604 (1915). See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504, (1956);
International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265-66 (1929); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 617-18 (1842). But see California v. Zook,
336 U.S. 725, 730 (1949).

1960]

RECENT CASES

vision against wire tapping impinged on federal constitutional jurisdiction under the commerce clause or on federal criminal jurisdiction
under section 605, and, if so, had the federal act "occupied the field"
to the exclusion of state action? Viewing the state statute as a "local
police measure" designed to protect against invasions of privacy, the
court held that there was no infringement of constitutional jurisdiction under the commerce clause.' 5 Likewise, the court pointed to
the doctrine of United States v. Marigold16 and the difference in
offenses' 7 punished by the two statutes and held that there was no
appearance of any impingement upon federal criminal jurisdiction.18
But even if there was infringement upon federal criminal jurisdiction,
the court, using the criteria of the Nelson case,' 9 held that as to all
three criteria20 there was a failure to show a clear intent on the part
of Congress to "occupy the field" of wire tapping to the exclusion of
the state.
Several factors tend to negate any presumption of a federal intent
to "occupy the field" of wire tapping. The statute itself contains no
direction or language manifesting such intent.2' The federal govern15. 5 N.Y.2d at 509, 158 N.E.2d at 822, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
16. "[T]he same act might, as to its character and tendencies, and the
consequences it involved, constitute an offense against both the State and
Federal governments, and might draw to its commission the penalties denounced by either, as appropriate to its character in reference to each." 50
U.S. (9 How.) 560, 569 (1850). See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
17. "It is clear... that subdivision 6 of section 1423 is violated by interception alone, whether or not there is a divulgence of the communication
and/or its fruits." 5 N.Y.2d at 510, 158 N.E.2d at 823, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
The Supreme Court has never decided whether both interception and divulgence are necessary under the Federal act. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S.
96, 100 n.5 (1957). This court seems to believe that they are both necessary.
5 N.Y.2d at 510, 158 N.E.2d at 823, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
18. 5 N.Y.2d at 510, 158 N.E.2d at 823, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
19. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra note 6.
20. (1) Pervasiveness of federal regulation: "[When the single clause of
section 605 is compared with the broad sweep of the Smith Act ... and the
Communist Control Act . . . the Nelson case is hardly persuasive authority

for holding the States pre-empted from punishing wire tapping." 5 N.Y.2d at
512, 158 N.E.2d at 824, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 240. (2) Dominance of federal interest:
The court finds that protection of the individual's right of privacy "is an
area primarily entrusted to the care of the States ... falling logically within
the ambit of the State's police power. In any case, the field of wire tapping
would not appear to be so peculiarly affected with a Federal interest that
State regulation 'must be assumed' to be precluded." 5 N.Y.2d at 513, 158
N.E.2d at 824, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 241. (3) Potential state-federal administrative
conflict: 'Entirely lacking... is the evidence of any requests to local authorities, by the President or the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
. . . to turn over to Federal authorities all information concerning wiretapping activities so as to 'avoid a hampering of uniform enforcement of its
program by sporadic local prosecutions'. . . . The sparsity of prosecutions
under section 605 ...indicates the absence of any 'federal program' to combat
wire tapping .... " 5 N.Y.2d at 513, 158 N.E.2d at 824-25, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 241-

42.
21. Brief for Respondent, p.46, People v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 500, 158 N.E.2d
817, 186 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1959).
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ment has made only one prosecution 2 under section 605, an indication
that punishment for wire tapping is almost exclusively a state matter.
The Supreme Court in two recent decisions3 involving the federal
statute failed to find pre-emption although such a holding would have
been supportable in either case. In addition Pennsylvania and Illinois
have recently enacted comprehensive wire tapping statutes 24 and
the Maryland Supreme Court5 has held no federal "occupancy of
the field," all of which are indications that states do not consider
themselves excluded by section 605 from a traditional area of state
control. A strong possibility exists that population growth and improved methods of communication will result in increased pressure
for uniform federal legislation in areas of traditional state control.
The result will be increased litigation and continued dissatisfaction
with the decisions if the present methods of determining federal
pre-emption are used. Only congressional action6 can insure a
satisfactory solution.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SCHOOLSUNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE REQUIRING BIBLE
READING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Plaintiffs, a husband, his wife and three children, sought a federal
court injunction prohibiting compulsory reading of the Bible and
recitation of the Lord's Prayer in the Pennsylvania schools attended
by the children.1 Under a Pennsylvania statute, verses from the Bible
22. Note, 67 YALE L.J. 932 &n.2 (1958).
23. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957) (New York statute authorizing wire tap by state officers invalid as conflicting with § 605); Schwartz v.
Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952) (admission of wire tap evidence in state court not
precluded by § 605). Texas has recently enacted a statute providing that all
evidence obtained in violation of § 605 is inadmissible in Texas courts. Note,
67 YALE L.J. 932, 934 & n.4 (1958).
24. Note, 67 YALE L.J. 932 (1958).

25. Robert v. State, 151 A.2d 737 (Md. 1959).
26. A congressional enactment similar to a bill which passed the House
(104 CONG. REc. 12808), but failed in the Senate in 1958 would practically solve
the problem.
"No Act of Congress shall be construed as indicating an intent on the
part of Congress to occupy the field in which such Act operates, to the
exclusion of all State laws in the same subject matter, unless such Act
contains an express provision to that effect, or unless there is a direct
and positive conflict between such Act and a State law so that the two
cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together." H.R. 3, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1958).
However, the bill as written, does not prevent a retroactive application which
could result in mass confusion. Congress should eliminate this possibility by
providing that the rule should apply only to Congressional legislation enacted
following the passage of this bill.
1. The parents are members of the Unitarian Church which they attend
with their three children. Two of the children are in junior high school. The
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are required to be read in the public schools on each school day. 2
Plaintiffs contended that this practice constituted an "establishment
of religion and a prohibiting of the free exercise thereof"3 in violation
of rights protected under the first amendment to the United States
Constitution and made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment.4 The defendants maintained that daily reading of Bible
oldest child, a son of eighteen, was a high school senior at the time the action

was filed, but inasmuch as he had been graduated prior to the trial, all parties

agreed that the application for an injunction as to him was moot. Nevertheless, the court considered the evidence he gave relevant to the practices in
the schools. 177 F. Supp. at 399. See note 3 infra.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1516 (1950) provides:
"At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, or caused to be
read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each
school day, by the teacher in charge: Provided, That where any teacher
has other teachers under and subject to direction, then the teacher exercising such authority shall read the Holy Bible, or cause it to be read, as
herein directed.
"If any school teacher, whose duty it shall be to read the Holy Bible,
or cause it to be read, shall fail or omit so to do, said school teacher shall,
upon charges preferred for such failure or omission, and proof of the
same, before the board of school directors of the school district, be discharged."
3. Plaintiffs made a similar complaint on the same grounds against the
daily practice of recitation of the Lord's Prayer immediately following the
scripture reading. Prayer is not mentioned in the statute, but the practice
had been employed for a number of years in the school. The court considered separately the issue raised by (1) the Bible reading and (2) the Bible
reading followed by recitation of the Lord's Prayer. 177 F. Supp. at 403-04.

One of the plaintiff children testified that "during the reading of the Bible
a standard of physical deportment and attention of higher caliber than usual

was required of the students." Id. at 400. The plaintiff-father testified that

the Bible was read in a manner of authority in excess of ordinary school au-

thority. The three children and their father testified as to matters of religious doctrine presented by a literal reading of the Bible in school which

were opposed to the religious beliefs held by their family. Although the
father did not complain to the school authorities concerning the practices he
sought to have enjoined, the decision relates the manner in which the oldest
child, Ellory Schempp, demonstrated his objections and the actions of the
school authorities in response, as follows:
"Ellory Schempp, however, did complain of the practices, and demonstrated his objection first in November of 1956 by reading to himself a

copy of the Koran while the Bible was being read, and refusing to stand
during the recitation of the Lord's Prayer. He testified that his home
room teacher stated to him that he should stand during the recitation of

the Lord's Prayer, and that he then asked to be excused from 'morning
devotions.' Afterwards he was sent to discuss the matter with the Vice-

Principal and the School Guidance Counsellor. As a result, for the re-

mainder of the year, Ellory spent the period given over for 'morning
devotions' each day in the Guidance Counsellor's office. At the beginning
of the next academic year . . . he asked his then home room teacher to
be excused from attendance at the ceremony. After discussing the matter

with the Assistant Principal, that official told Ellory that he should remain in the home room and attend the morning Bible reading and prayer

recitation period as did the other students. This he did for the remainder
of the year." Id. at 401.
4. The first amendment provides that: "Congress shall make no law re-

specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
.... "In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Supreme Court

brought the first amendment guaranties of religious freedom within the rights

protected against infringement by state action under the fourteenth amend-

ment. The plaintiffs in the instant case cited Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
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verses without comment does not favor or establish religion or prohibit the free exercise thereof but is an aid to mental and moral
training of pupils which the state has a right to utilize. The defendants further asserted that in respect to religious practices there
was no compulsion upon the plaintiffs. Held, for the plaintiffs. Reading from the Bible in the public schools as required by the Pennsylvania statute is an unconstitutional establishment of religion and an
interference with the free exercise thereof. Schempp v. School Dist.
of Abington Township, 177 F. Supp. 398 (1959).
The constitutionality of Bible reading in the public schools under
both the federal and state constitutions has been widely litigated in
the state courts, and the majority of jurisdictions considering the question have upheld the practice.5 The issue usually involved is whether
the Bible or the particular version of the Bible used is sectarian literature.6 The Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality
U.S. 105 (1943) for the same principle.
S. Decisions sustaining compulsory Bible reading: Spiller v. Inhabitants of
Woburn, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 127 (1866); Church v. Bullock, 104 Tex. 1, 109
S.W. 115 (1908). Decisions holding compulsory Bible reading invalid: People
ex tel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910); State ex rel.
Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853, 91 N.W. 846 (1902); State ex rel. Finger v.
Weedman, 55 S.D. 343, 226 N.W. 348 (1929). Compulsory attendance but not
the Bible reading itself was held invalid in People ex rel. Vollmar v, Stanley,
81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927).
Decisions sustaining Bible reading with no direct legal compulsion: People
ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927); Wilkerson v. City
of Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 110 S.E. 895 (1921); Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 20
N.W. 475 (1884); Billard v. Board of Educ., 69 Kan. 53, 76 Pac. 422 (1904);
Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School Dist., 120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 792 (1905);
Pfeiffer v. Board of Educ., 118 Mich. 560, 77 N.W. 250 (1898); Kaplan v. Independent School Dist., 171 Minn. 142, 214 N.W. 18 (1927); Doremus v. Board
of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 429 (1952);
Lewis v. Board of Educ., 247 App. Div. 106, 286 N.Y. Supp. 174 (1936); Nessle
v. Hum, 2 Ohio Dec. 60 (Mahoning County C.P. 1894); Stevenson v. Hanyon, 7
Pa. Dist. 585 (Lackawanna Co. C.P. 1898); Carden v. Bland, 199 Tenn. 665, 288
S.W.2d 718 (1956). Decisions holding Bible reading with no direct legal compulsion invalid: Herold v. Parish Bd. of Educ., 136 La. 1034, 68 So. 116 (1915);
State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890). Use of
the Bible as a textbook rather than a religious exercise was sustained in
Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854).
Less than a month before the instant case was decided, the New York Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a board of education resolution
directing that a nonsectarian prayer be recited each day in the public schools.
However, the court conditioned its approval on the board's adoption of a
procedure to insure that the parents are notified of the prayers and asked to
indicate if their children should participate in them. In a well documented
and scholarly opinion, Justice Meyer reviewed the history of the problem of
separation of church and state in America stressing the constitutional issue.
Engel v. Vitale, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1959). For a survey of the state
court Bible reading cases, see Id. at 487-90.
6. Cushman concludes that the wording of the various state constitutional
provisions for religious freedom appears unimportant in affecting the outcome
of the Bible reading cases in the state courts, for courts confronted with substantially the same facts under practically identical constitutional provisions
have sustained opposite results. To substantiate this conclusion he cites the
similarities between the constitutional provisions of Texas (under which
compulsory Bible reading was sustained) and Illinois (under which compul-
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of public school Bible reading, having rejected the opportunity to
7
decide this question in Doremus v. Board of Education.
The history of the adoption of the first amendment indicates that
the drafters primarily intended the "establishment of religion" clause
to prohibit the establishment of a national church.8 Although the
Court has incorporated Jefferson's "wall of separation between
Church and State" doctrine 9 into its interpretation of the clause, it
subsequently held 0 that a congressional appropriation for an addition to a hospital operated by a religious order was not a law respecting the establishment of religion. Not until 1947 in Everson v. Board
of Education," did the Court indicate an intent to enforce rigidly the
sory Bible reading was held invalid), and between Colorado (under which
voluntary Bible reading was sustained) and Wisconsin (under which it was
held invalid). Cushman, The Holy Bible and the Public Schools, 40 CORNELL
L.Q. 475, 477 & n.12 (1955).
In two cases Catholics objected to compulsory reading of the King James
version of the Bible in public schools as restricting their freedom of conscience. The practice was held invalid: People ex tel. Ring v. Board of Educ.,
245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910); State ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 55 S.D. 343,
226 N.W. 348 (1929).
In all of the cases listed in note 5 supra, where Bible .reading with no direct
legal compulsion was sustained, it was found that the versions or portions of
the Bible used were not sectarian. In the following cases, however the Bible
readings were held to be sectarian: People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ.,
245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910); Herold v. Parish Bd. of Educ., 136 La. 1034,
68 So. 116 (1915) (New Testament); State ex rel. Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb.
853, 91 N.W. 846 (1902); Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880
(1950), appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 429 (1952); State ex rel. Weiss v. District
Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890) (King James version). On sectarian instruction in the public schools, see Punke, Religious Issues in American Public Education, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 138 (1955); Sutherland, Due Process
and Disestablishment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1306, 1338-44 (1949); Comment, Bible
Reading in the Public Schools, 22 ALBANY L. REV. 156 (1958); Note, Bible
Reading in Public Schools, 9 VAND. L. REV. 849 (1956).
Statutes requiring Bible reading in the public schools: ALA. CODE ANN. tit.
52, §§ 542-44 (1940); ARK.STAT. ANN. § 80-1606 (1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14,
§ 4102 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 231.09(2) (1943); GA. CODE ANN. § 32-705
(1952); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-2705 (1948); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.170
(1955); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 71, § 31 (1945); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:14-77 (1940)
(Old Testament only); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1516 (1950); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 49-1307 (1956). Statutes permitting but not requiring Bible reading in
the public schools: IowA CODE ANN. § 280.9 (1949); KANs. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 72-1722 (1949); N.D. REV. CODE § 15-3812 (1943).
7. The Court refused to hear the merits of this case since the appellant's
interest as a taxpayer was insufficient to constitute a justiciable controversy
while the question of the rights of the child in the case became moot with
her graduation from school. 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), appeal dismissed,
342 U.S. 429 (1952).
8. See 1 BENTON, ANNALs OF CoNGaRss 729-31

(1858); BRADY, CoNFUsIoN

TwicE CONFOUNDED 5-49 (1955). See also notes 11 & 14 infra.
9. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). See note 11
infra for origin of "wall of separation" doctrine.
10. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
11. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The majority opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Black
traced the history of the development of the movement for separation of
church and state from the religious persecutions of Europe and colonial
America to the views on religious freedom expressed by Jefferson and Madison, which influenced the drafting of the first amendment. For additional
historical survey of separation of church and state, see Engel v. Vitale, 191

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 13

"wall of separation" doctrine. Although the Court in that case unanimously agreed that the first amendment prohibits state aid to religion,
five of the justices considered transportation of children to parochial
schools at public expense to be aiding the children, not religion. 12 A
year later the Court in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of EducationI3 rejected as an unconstitutional aid to religion a public school
"released time" program whereby religious groups were permitted
to conduct religious instruction on school property during school hours
for students released from part of their regular studies at their parents' requests. 14 In Zorach v. Clauson15 the Court qualified its position
N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Lardner, How Far Does the Constitution Separate Church and State?, 45 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 110 (1951).

The Court in the Everson case found the "establishment of religion" clause
of the first amendment to mean:
"Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion
by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.'"
330 U.S. at 15-16.
The "wall of separation" doctrine has its origin in a phrase used by President Jefferson in a letter to a group of Baptists in 1802. In Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879), Chief Justice Waite, expressing the unanimous opinion of the Court on the meaning of the religious freedom clause
of the first amendment, declared this phrase to be "almost an authoritative
declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment."
12. The New Jersey statute under which the parochial school students were
transported was held not to violate the first amendment, which "requires the
state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power
is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them."
330 U.S. at 18. Mr. Justice Rutledge, in his dissent also discussed Madison and
Jefferson on religious liberty and concluded that the first amendment prohibits
"not simply an established church, but any law respecting an establishment
of religion .

. . ."

Id. at 31. For a criticism of the reasoning of the majority

opinion and the dissent, which approves of the result in Everson, see O'NEILL,
RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 189-218 (1949).
13. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). A voluntary association, the Champaign Council on
Religious Education, had received permission from the Board of Education
to offer religious classes for less than an hour each week. The instructors
were employed by the council at no expense to the schools but were subject
to approval and supervision by the superintendent of schools. The religious
instructors made absentee reports to the secular teachers. Students not desiring to undertake the religious instruction were required to go from their
classrooms to other parts of the school to continue their secular studies. The
complainant, an atheist parent and taxpayer, sought relief against continued
use of the school buildings for the purposes of this program. Id. at 208-09.
14. Counsel for the Board of Education maintained that "historically the
First Amendment was intended to forbid only government preference of one
religion over another, not an impartial governmental assistance of all religions." The Court, however, rejected this contention. Id. at 211. Mr. Justice
Black, who delivered the opinion concluded: "[T]he First Amendment rests
upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve
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in McCollum, upholding a New York "released time" program in
which the cooperation of the schools was found to be an accommodation rather than an aid to religion since the religious classes were not
conducted on school property and the only assistance given by the
schools was the release of pupils to take religious studies at the request
of their parents. 16 Zorach seems to represent a partial relaxation of
the "wall of separation" doctrine, which had reached its zenith in
McCollum.
Study of the Bible in the public schools for its historical, moral, literary or artistic merit if divorced from religious indoctrination, the
their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective
sphere." Id. at 212. In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter presented
a documented survey of the decreasing sectarianism of the American public
schools and their increasing secularization. Id. at 212-32. Mr. Justice Reed,
dissenting, took issue with the majority's interpretation of the phrase "an
establishment of religion":
"The phrase 'an establishment of religion' may have been intended by Congress to be aimed only at a state church. When the First Amendment was
pending in Congress in substantially its present form, 'Mr. Madison said, he
apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men
to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience.' Passing years,
however, have brought about acceptance of a broader meaning, although never

until today, I believe, has this Court widened its interpretation to any such
degree as holding that recognition of the interest of our nation in religion,
through the granting, to qualified representatives of the principal faiths, of
opportunity to present religion as an optional, extracurricular subject during
released school time in public school buildings, was equivalent to an establishment of religion." Id. at 244, quoting from 1 BENTON, ANNALs OF CONGRESS 730
(1858). See Cushman, Public Support of Religious Education in American
Constitutional Law, 45 ILL. L. REv. 333, 349-56 (1950). For criticisms of the
McCollum rationale, see O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, 219-53 (1949). See also Corwin, The Supreme Court as National
School Board, 14 LAw & CONTEIVIP. PROB. 3 (1949), for sounder criticisms. For a
discussion of Everson and McCollum, see BRADY, CoNFUsIoN TwICE CON51-161 (1955); Lardner, How Far Does the Constitution Separate
Church and State?, 45 Amv. POL. ScI. REV. 110, 127-32 (1951).
15. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
16. The New York Court of Appeals distinguished the New York "released

FOUNDED,

time" program from the one found unconstitutional in McCollum as follows:

"In the New York City program there is neither supervision nor approval
of religious teachers and no solicitation of pupils or distribution of cards.
The religious instruction must be outside the school building and grounds.
There must be no announcement of any kind in the public schools relative to the program and no comment by any principal or teacher on the
attendance or non-attendance of any pupil upon religious instruction. All
that the school does besides excusing the pupil is to keep a record-which
is not available for any other purpose-in order to see that the excuses
are not taken advantage of and the school deceived, which is, of course,
the same procedure the school would take in respect of absence for any
other reason." Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 168-69; 100 N.E.2d 463,
465 (1951).
Mr. Justice Douglas, expressing the majority opinion of the United States
Supreme Court invited attention to the ways in which government recognizes
and accommodates religion by Thanksgiving Day proclamations, prayers in
legislative assemblies, courtroom oaths and other examples of recognition of
God. He recognized the strong religious spirit in our population:
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make
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court in the instant case held not objectionable. Primarily, however,
the court found that the Bible is a book of worship 7 and reading it
daily to children as the Pennsylvania statute requires amounts to religious instruction even if the religious concepts may vary from child
to child or are not instilled at all. 18 The statute was held to aid all
religions-specifically Christianity-in violation of the first amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Everson case.19 Finding that the scripture reading and prayer recitation periods were
often called "morning devotions" and that more respectful behavior
than usual was required of the students during these periods, the court
concluded that these exercises were of a religious nature. 20 Even if
the evidence establishes that the religion promulgated is sectless, that
room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of
man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of government
that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When
the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious
authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs,
it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious
nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a
requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious
groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe. Government may not finance religious groups nor
undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education
nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion on any person.
But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for
government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts
to widen the effective scope of religious influence. The government must
be neutral when it comes to competition between sects. It may not thrust
any sect on any person. It may not make a religious observance compulsory. It may not coerce anyone to attend church, to observe a religious
holiday, or to take religious instruction. But it can close its doors or
suspend its operations as to those who want to repair to their religious
sanctuary for worship or instruction. No more than that is undertaken
here." 343 U.S. at 313-14.
Mr. Justice Black dissented on the ground that in accordance with the McCollum decision government must maintain complete neutrality toward religion, and the New York "released time" program did not cure the weakness
of the Illinois plan in that both systems used compulsory school machinery to
channel pupils into sectarian classes by releasing students attending the religious classes from part of their academic studies. Id. at 315-20. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Jackson expressed rather similar dissenting
views. Id. at 320-25. For comment on Zorach, see Cushman, The Holy Bible
and the Public Schools, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 475, 488-94 (1955) (comparing Everson, McCollum, and Zorach). See also Engel v. Vitale, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 483-86
(Sup. Ct. 1959). Compare Perry v. School Dist. No. 81, 344 P.2d 1036 (Wash.
1959), sustaining a released time program similar to the one in Zorach.
17. The court heard the testimony of two expert witnesses, a Jewish theologian who testified for the plaintiffs that portions of the New Testament
were offensive to Jews if read to children without explanation, and a Protestant minister, a defense witness, who stated the opinion that excluding
the New Testament from Bible reading would be a sectarian practice.
Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 177 F. Supp. 398, 401-04
(1959).
18. Id. at 404-05.
19. 330 U.S. at 15-16.
20. 177 F. Supp. at 405-06.

19601

RECENT CASES

Protestant, Catholic and Jewish versions of the Bible have all been
read at various of the daily exercises, or that different religions have
been equally established, the practices are nevertheless unconstitutional2 under the McCollum rationale. 22 Moreover, since the Bible
was found to be an "essentially religious text," a state requirement
of daily reading in public schools is proscribed by the first amendment
and the McCollum doctrine regardless of whether the practice is considered a religious ceremony. 24 Although the statute does not compel
the pupils to attend the Bible reading exercises, their attendance at
school is required by law, and the teachers who are compelled by the
statute to conduct these exercises will naturally use every effort to
assure that their students are present.2 Because of such indirect or
subtle compulsion the statute was held to restrict the free exercise of
religion.2
In its enthusiasm for protecting the rights of the plaintiffs, the court
took an unnecessarily extreme step in ruling the Pennsylvania statute
unconstitutional. The court altered the meaning of "compulsion" by
including within its definition subtle pressures and social suasion.
Assuming the court was correct in its finding that the attendance of
the school children at the Bible reading and prayer exercises was compulsory, it was not shown that this compulsion was required by the
statute. The statute does not expressly compel the attendance of
public school students at the Bible reading exercises, and although
the statute does not set forth procedures for allowing those children to
be excused whose parents disapprove of the practice, it seems that
the statute would permit such procedures to be employed.27 The
court could, therefore, have condemned the compulsory practices
21. Id. at 406.
22. 333 U.S. at 212.
23. 177 F. Supp. at 406.
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 406-07. The court noted that the statute imposed the sanction of
discharge from office on teachers who fail to observe the required exercises.
It was shown that the plaintiff Ellory Schempp was told to attend the exercises by the Assistant Principal, acting under official authority, see note 3
supra. Ellory's home room teacher also directed him on one occasion to stand
while the Lord's Prayer was recited. The court recognized the tendency of
children to imitate and conform to the behavior of their associates.
26. The argument that subtle pressure constitutes compulsion was rejected
by Justice Meyer in the Engel case: "To recognize 'subtle pressures' as compulsion under the [First] Amendment is to stray far afield from the oppressions the Amendment was designed to prevent; to raise the psychology of
dissent, which produced pressure on every dissenter, to the level of governmental force; and to subordinate the spiritual needs of believers to the psychological needs of nonbelievers. The equality of treatment which the
Amendment was designed to produce does not require, indeed proscribes, so
doing." 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 492 & n. 172. See also Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in the McCollum case, 333 U.S. at 232.
27. For text of the Pennsylvania statute, see note 2 supra. No language in
the statute indicates that a procedure allowing nonparticipation in the exercises by children of objecting parents would violate any provision of the
statute. Nonparticipation procedures could be instituted in various ways, by
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found to exist in the instant case without holding the statute unconstitutional. As the Zorach 28 opinion noted and approved, government
recognition of God and a religious spirit are an important part of the
American heritage. Thanksgiving Day proclamations, prayers in Congress, and chaplains in the armed forces are but a few examples of
this recognition. Including public school Bible reading in this category
of government recognition of religion seems desirable if it can be
insured that participation in the exercises is voluntary. This would
be in accord with the original meaning of the first amendment. It is
submitted that the rationale of the recent New York case of Engel V.
Vitale2 is better reasoned than the holding in the instant case and is
more likely to be followed in future decisions in the area of religious
instruction in public schools. Nevertheless, the Bible reading statutes
most likely to survive future constitutionality attacks are those which
expressly safeguard against compulsory participation or attendance.

CRIMINAL LAW-BRIBERY-OFFER TO GIVE MONEY
TO CONGRESSMAN'S POLITICAL PARTY
Defendant allegedly made an offer to his Congressman to contribute
$1,000 per year to the Republican party in exchange for the Congressman's use of influence to procure a federal postmastership for defendant. The government charged defendant with having offered a bribe
to procure an appointive public office in violation of section 214 of
the federal anti-bribery statute.' The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the information did not state
2
facts sufficient to constitute an offense against the United States. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed. An
offer to a Congressman to pay money to his political party in exchange
for his use of influence in securing an appointive position for the
offeror is a crime under the statute. United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S.
255 (1959).
Section 214 is similar in terminology to the definition of bribery at
school boards, principals and teachers. For a discussion of alternative procedures, see Engel v. Vitale, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 492-93 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
28. 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952). See note 16 supra.
29. 191 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1959). See note 5 supra.
1. 18 U.S.C. 214 (1952) provides:
"Whoever pays or offers or promises any money or thing of value, to any
person, firm, or corporation in consideration of the use or promise to use any
influence to procure an appointive office or place under the United States for
any person, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both."
2. United States v. Shirey, 168 F. Supp. 382 (D.C. Pa. 1958).
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common law3 and under state statutes.4 Generally "the bribe may be
in the form of money, property, services or anything else of value."5
But it "must be something real, substantial, and of value to the receiver, as distinguished from something imaginary, illusive, or
amounting to nothing more than the gratification of a wish or hope
on his part."6 When confronted with third-party beneficiary situations
such as that in the instant case, the state courts have usually theorized
that a bribee can receive a thing of value even though the stated consideration flows from the bribor to a third party. It has been held that
a payment to a campaign fund may be a bribe7 even though the bribee
is not a candidate for public office; 8 a promise to an alderman to reinstate a city employee is a promise of a thing of value to the alderman; 9
and a promise by a candidate for public office to work for less than his
statutory salary is a promise of a thing of value to the voters.10 No
case involving a violation of section 214 has previously been considered
by any of the federal courts," and out of the four cases arising under
section 215 (soliciting bribes) only one comes close to the third-party
beneficiary problem. 12 It is of little value as precedent, however, since
the defendant was also charged with soliciting money for his own per13
sonal benefit.
In the instant case the Court took no notice of any of the federal or
state court bribery decisions, but confined itself to interpretation of
3. "Bribery, at common law, is defined to be 'the receiving or offering any
undue reward by or to any person whatever whose ordinary profession or
business relates to the administration of public justice, in order to influence
his behavior in office, and incline him to act contrary to the known rules of
honesty and integrity.'" Walsh v. People, 65 Ill. 58, 65, 16 Am.Rep. 569, 575
(1872).
4. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 378; TENN. CODE AwN. § 39-801 (1956).
5. Perkins, Sampling the Evolution of Social Engineering, 17 U. PITT. L.
REv. 362 (1956).
6. People v. Hyde, 156 App.Div. 618, 141 N.Y.Supp. 1089, 1093 (1913), 13
COLUm.

,.
REV. 643.

7. State v. Smagula, 39 N.J.Super. 187, 120 A.2d 621 (1956), 55 A.L.R.2d
1132 (1957).
8. In re Crum, 55 N.D. 876, 215 N.W. 682 (1927), 55 A.L.R. 220 (1928).
9. People ex rel. Dickenson v. Van de Carr, 87 App.Div. 386, 84 N.Y. Supp.
461 (1903).
10. State ex rel. Church v. Dustin, 5 Ore. 375 (1875); State ex rel. Newell v.
Purdy, 36 Wis. 213 (1874).
11. 168 F. Supp. at 384.
12. United States v. Hood, 200 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1953).
13. "Several of the paragraphs of the indictment alleged to be prejudicial
and surplusage charge that it was a part of the conspiracy to pretend that
the contributions would be used by the Mississippi Democratic Committee and
that the Committee was in need of funds to meet office expenses, and then
to fail to maintain books and records maintaining the amount of contributions and money received by said Committee and to fail to report to the
Mississippi Democratic Committee the amount of money received. Such averments go to show that there was no necessary repugnancy between soliciting
and receiving money as political contributions and doing so for the personal
emolument of the defendants." 200 F.2d at 642. (Emphasis added.)
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the federal statute. The majority 14 felt that either of two possible
constructions would serve to condemn the activities of the defendant.
Under one reading, "even though the Republican Party was to be the
ultimate recipient of the money, this was a promise to Stauffer of
money .... ,,15 Under the other reading, "the word 'person' in the
statute is broad enough to include the Republican Party ..

."16

The

majority ignored the government's contention that an offer to make
a contribution to the political party was an offer of a "thing of value"
to the Congressman.' 7 The four dissenting justices felt that it was a
"remarkable construction of the language of § 214 to find that an
offer to X to pay money to Y, with whom X is not claimed to have
any financial relationship, is an offer of money to X."18 They experienced further difficulty in understanding the statement that the Republican Party is a person, particularly since the majority had first
described it as an "'amorphous group of individuals.' "19
It appears that the majority reached the correct result but by a
somewhat novel approach. The correct approach would seem to be
that insisted upon by the government, i.e., that an offer to a Congressman to make a contribution to his political party is an offer of a
"thing of value" to the Congressman. This conclusion would be a
little easier to justify, of course, had the Congressman solicited the
contribution for his party.20 But both theories advanced by the majority present some difficulties. The statement that an offer to X to
pay money to Y is an offer of money to X is somewhat contradictory.
The money was not to be paid to X; it was to be paid to Y. And to say
that an offer to X to pay money to Y would always constitute a bribe
might lead to embarrassing consequences, particularly if Y in this
case had been the Democratic party or the defendant's aged mother.
This leaves only one logical approach, and that is to determine whether a "thing of value" has been offered to the bribee.
14. Only four justices joined in the majority opinion, and one filed a concurring opinion.
15. 359 U.S. at 256.
16. Id. at 257.
17. Id. at 264.
18. Id. at 268.
19. Id. at 269.
20. "That the thing the defendant asked on this occasion was desirable to
himself, there is ground to believe from the evidence. Since he asked for it,
and offered in return for it official protection, the consideration evidently was
desirable to him." Scott v. State, 107 Ohio St. 475, 141 N.E. 19, 23 (1923).
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CRIMINAL LAW-CONFESSIONS-REQUIREMENT OF
CORROBORATION OF EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION
Defendant confessed extrajudicially to the arson of a church rectory
which resulted in the deaths of three persons.' On the basis of this
confession, he was indicted and convicted of first degree murder under
the New Jersey felony-murder statute. On appeal, defendant argued
that, in view of the trial court's charge that the corpus delicti must
be proved independently of the confession and beyond a reasonable
doubt, the prosecution failed for lack of sufficient corroboration of
the confession. 2 Held, affirmed. The lower court's charge placed a
greater burden on the state than the law required since corroborative
proof need only establish the trustworthiness of the confession, plus
independent proof of loss or injury, and not the corpus delicti.3 State
v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 152 A.2d 50 (1959).
Though not without distinguished critics,4 the rule that extrajudicial
1. Nine months after the fire, the defendant aroused the suspicion of a

police officer who stopped the defendant and had him empty his pockets. The
search disclosed seven packs of matches, numerous religious pamphlets and
a newspaper photograph of the monsignor who died in the fire. The confession to the rectory fire came after the defendant had confessed to starting
several other fires in the vicinity. It appeared that the defendant was determined to be converted to Catholicism and had been taking instruction in
anticipation of the fulfillment of this aim. This determination ceased shortly
after the fire along with defendant's habit of crossing himself when passing
the cathedral. The reason, later contradicted, for starting the fire was that
the defendant was angry as a result of an argument with a priest who told
him that he had learned his catechism incorrectly.
2. The only other significant point raised on appeal was the question of
insanity. In that regard, the court found sufficient evidence to sustain the
finding of the jury that the defendant was legally sane under the M'Naghten
rule at the time of the fire.
3. There are three elements to any crime: (1) an actual loss or injury, e.g.,
in homicide, a person deceased; in arson, a house burned; (2) a criminal
agency, as opposed to accident; and (3) the accused's identity as the guilty
person. Dean Wigmore suggests that the correct view of the term corpus
delicti signifies only the first element. He notes, however, that most courts
include the second element. A third view advanced, "too absurd to argue
with," would include the last element. 7 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2070-72 (3d ed.
1940). "The finding of a dead body establishes only the corpus. The finding
of such body under circumstances that indicate a crime would establish the
delicti or felonious -intent." 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 325 (10th ed.
1912). From the foregoing, it may be observed that the court's overall holding in the principal case is contradictory. This results from the use of two
conflicting definitions of the term corpus delicti. At one point the court says
that independent proof of the actual loss or injury is required; this loss or
injury is usually considered to be the first element of the corpus delicti.
Later the court says that the corroborative proof need establish only the
trustworthiness of the confession and not the corpus delicti. It is felt that the
court in the latter case meant that both elements need not be proved, i.e.,
actual loss must be proved but not the criminal agency. For judicial interpretations of the term corpus delicti, see 9 WORDS AD PHRASES 749 (Supp.
1959). See Note, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 638, 649 (1955).
4. "That the rule has in fact any substantial necessity in justice, we are
much disposed to doubt .... [I] t seems to us that such evils as it corrects
could be much more flexibly treated by the judge at triaL" Daeche v. United
States, 250 Fed. 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1918) (L. Hand, J.). The Massachusetts
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confessions must be substantiated by corroborative proof in order to
sustain a conviction5 is firmly entrenched in American statutory and
common law.6 The purpose of the rule originally was to prevent convictions based on false confessions where there was in fact no actual
loss or injury, e.g., in a confession to murder, no death in fact. Coincident with this initial purpose, corroborative proof of criminal agency
was not required.7 Today, the purpose of the rule is to prevent convictions based on any false confession, whether obtained through mistake, illegal inducement, coercion or mental incompetence of the
accused. 8 The courts are in conflict regarding the nature9 and the
quantum 0 of corroborative proof the state must introduce before the
Supreme Court has called it "an artificial quantitative rule." Commonwealth

v. Kimball, 321 Mass. 290, 73 N.E.2d 468, 470 (1947). See also 3 WIGmoRE,
EVIDENCE §§ 865-67 (3d ed. 1940); McCoRMIcK, EvIDEc. at 320, n. 5 (1954).

5. The rule originated in England, where, at the early common law, a naked
confession was sufficient to support a conviction. After a few courts experienced the shock of the reappearance of a supposed murder victim after his
murderer had been executed, the British began to question this sufficiency.
No clear rule ever evolved, however, and this country was left free to develop
its own doctrine. Whereas the English rule had been restricted to murder and
bigamy, the American versions have extended to almost all crimes. And
from the original requirement that corroboration need establish only the
actual loss, as espoused by Wigmore, the additional corroborative proof of
criminal agency became necessary. Wigmore states that the historical causes
of this "sentimental irrationality" were threefold: (1) the meek, acquiescent
attitude of the lower classes, where the large portion of crimes arose; (2)
the overly cautious tendency of the Nisi Prius judges in admitting doubtful
testimony; and (3) the common law disability of the defendant to testify for
himself or have counsel. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDEN E § 867 (3d ed. 1940). See
generally Note, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 638 (1955); 56 MIcH. L. REv. 636 (1958);
31 TuL. L. REv. 361 (1957); 1956 WASH. U.L.Q. 483. For the rule in American
military law, see Beale, The Corpus Delicti, 1959 JAG J. 11. For the Canadian
view, see Borins, Confessions, 1 CalM. L.Q. 140 (1959); Cooper, Admissibility
of Confessions, Id. at 46.
6. Massachusetts is the only jurisdiction that has categorically stated that
it does not follow the general corroboration rule. Commonwealth v. Kimball,
321 Mass. 290, 73 N.E.2d 468 (1947). The court gave no reason for its position
and a search of earlier cases reveals none. Perhaps it is based on the unanswerable logic of the dictum handed down in Commonwealth v. Killion,
194 Mass. 153, 80 N.E. 222, 223 (1907): "And so far as the danger of conviction
for a crime that may not have been committed is concerned, it is to be observed that innocent persons do not confess to crimes which they have not
committed . . . ." Wisconsin has been joined with Massachusetts as not
adhering to the general rule; it is believed that this is a result of a misinterpretation of the cases. See State v. Bronston, 7 Wis. 2d 627, 97 N.W.2d 504
(1959); Potman v. State, 259 Wis. 234, 47 N.W.2d 884 (1951); State v. Dehart,
242 Wis. 562, 8 N.W.2d 360 (1943). New Hampshire and South Dakota have
been silent on the subject. See Note, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 638, 641 (1955).
7. See, e.g., note 13 infra.
8. See Note, 103 U. PA. L. Rav. 638 (1955); 56 MICH. L. REV. 636 (1958); 31
TUL. L. REV. 361 (1957); 1956 WASH. U.L.Q. 483.
9. The overwhelming majority of the courts require that the corroborative
proofs relate to the corpus delicti. But then, it is difficult to see what useful
evidence the state could introduce that would not relate to the corpus delicti.
A few courts seem to require that the extrinsic evidence lend credence to the
confession while not necessarily proving the corpus delicti. See Annot., 45
A.L.R.2d 1316 (1956); Note, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 638, 641, nn. 21, 22, 137 (1955).
10. Pennsylvania is the only state that requires that the corpus delicti be
proved aliunde the confession and beyond a reasonable doubt. Mississippi
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confession may be considered evidential. In general, evidence of
corroboration must relate to and tend to establish the corpus delicti,
but this corroborative evidence need not prove the corpus delicti, or
the defendant's guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt.' In New Jersey,
the basic requirement of corroboration may be traced back to 1818.12
In the next century and a half the rule never became fixed and the
courts lapsed into a state of confusion which continues to the present
time.13
Relying on Dean Wigmore, the court concluded that the evil at
which the rule was aimed was the improper conviction of a person
based on his false confession where no actual loss had occurred.14
This evil, the court felt, is overcome by the requirement of independent proof of the fact of loss or injury-in the instant case, the
burned rectory and the bodies of the deceased. Further, this independent proof of actual loss or injury, coupled with proof of facts
and circumstances tending to establish the trustworthiness of the
confession, is the rule best designed to allow efficient administration
of the criminal law while affording the accused ample protection of
his rights. The danger is somewhat greater, the court believes, that
persons will confess falsely to actual crimes where both elements of
the corpus delicti are already apparent. Thus a person is more likely
requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The remainder of the

states vary from a flexible requirement of proof to a requirement of prima
facie proof. Variation in proof often depends upon the nature of the crime.

Normally, less evidence is needed to satisfy the requirement of corroborative

proofs of the criminal agency as compared to that required for the actual loss
or injury. See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1316 (1956); Note, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 638,
659 (1955).
11. Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1316 (1956).
12. "The law then ... seems to be pretty well settled, that upon the naked
confession of such an infant, he cannot be convicted of a capital crime."
State v. Aaron, 4 N.J.L. 263, 272 (1818) (twelve year old slave convicted of
murder of a two year old child).
13. The rule as applied in the instant case was said by the court to have
been first enunciated in State v. Guild, 10 N.J.L. 163 (1828). This is not
correct. In the Guild case, the court said in dictum that when, as was true in
that case, the corpus delicti is proved independently of the confession, no
further corroboration is necessary. Almost a full century later the Court of
Errors and Appeals ignored the Guild case and looked to New York and
Massachusetts for authority. "Full proof of the . . . corpus delicti . . . is not
required. It may be proved by the confession itself, corroborated by other
evidence." State v. Banusik, 84 N.J.L. 640, 64 Atl. 994, 996 (E. & A. 1906).
Six years afterwards, the same court, citing Guild, held that the only limitation on the use of a confession was the want of proof of the corpus delicti.

State v. Kwiatkowski, 83 N.J.L. 650, 85 Atl. 209 (E. & A. 1912). In State v.

James, 96 N.J.L. 132, 114 Ati. 553 (E. & A. 1921), the court graciously recognized both rules. This delightful situation reached its climax in State v.
Cooper, 10 N.J. 532, 92 A.2d 786 (1952), wherein the court compressed the
rules back together. Apparently the court in the present case thought it best
to start all over.
To find that he is in truth
14. "[F] or example, a man has disappeared ....
dead, yet not by criminal violence-i.e. to find the second element lacking, is
not the discovery against which the rule is designed to warn and protect us."
7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 401 (3d ed. 1940).
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to confess to the killing of a victim found dead with a gunshot wound
in the back than to an event not in itself criminal. In such a situation, it is the court's opinion that the rule adopted provides the
accused with greater protection than a requirement of independent
proof of the corpus delicti.
Having no clear precedent to follow,1 5 the court, taking two diver-

gent concepts, grafted a part of one to the whole of another, forming
a hybrid.16 While theoretically adequate, the rule will surely encounter practical difficulties in its implementation by trial judges.
Generally, the requirement of corroboration of extrajudicial confessions is a desirable thing, but the courts have exaggerated its importance and have succeeded in obscuring the true problem behind a
veil of semanticsY It is felt that a flexible requirement of corroboration, integrated with other rules of evidence and proper instructions
from the court, should be sufficient to protect a defendant in all his
rights.18

EVIDENCE-EXPERT TESTIMONY-INADMISSIBILITY OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY THAT A NARCOTIC ADDICT IS
UNWORTHY OF BELIEF
Defendant was convicted in a New York court of selling narcotics.1
The principal witness for the prosecution, who testified that he had
purchased heroin from defendant, admitted having been a drug addict
15. See note 10 supra.
16. From the rule which requires the state to introduce independent proof
of the corpus delicti, the court has removed any requirement as to the
criminal agency element. This abbreviated rule was joined with a minority
view whereby the corroborative proofs need not touch on the corpus delicti
but must be such as to strengthen and bolster the confession. See Annot., 45
A.L.R.2d 1316 (1956); Note, 103 U..PA. L. REV. 638, 647 (1955).
17. The case involving a serious crime in which there is no evidence other
than a confession is extremely rare. Moreover, the rule protects only those
defendants who confess and later repudiate their confessions; if a person is
bent on judicial suicide, he can always confess in the courtroom. The most
persuasive factor in favor of the rule is the danger that the false confession
was the result of police methods. The rule prohibiting involuntary confessions
is adequate protection against this, however. Wigmore believes that, ordinarily, the problem is reduced to a question of whether or not to give one
more piece of evidence to the jury. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 867 (3d ed. 1940).
18. See Judge Learned Hand's remarks, note 3 supra. Dean Wigmore advocates receiving all well proved confessions in evidence, leaving them to the
jury, subject to all discrediting circumstances, to receive such weight as may
seem proper. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 867 (3d ed. 1940). Flexibility of the
rule is particularly desirable in those cases involving crimes in which scienter
is a necessary element, e.g., uttering a forged instrument, knowingly receiving stolen goods. There the proof is almost solely within the knowledge
of the defendant, and a fixed rule becomes a judicial obstruction rather than
a safeguard.
1. N.Y. Penal Law § 1751 (1).
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until four months prior to the trial.2 To impeach the credibility of
this witness the defense counsel called a physician to testify concerning the addict's supposed propensity to lie. The trial judge refused
to admit in evidence the doctor's opinion that an addict such as the
witness was not worthy of belief.3 Claiming that this exclusion was
error, defendant brought this appeal before the Court of Appeals of
New York, after an adverse decision in the appellate division.4 Held,
affirmed. Expert testimony by a physician that narcotic addicts are
not worthy of belief is inadmissible unless there is general recognition that such is the consensus of scientific and medical opinion.
People v. Williams, 6 N.Y.2d 18, 187 N.Y.S.2d 750, 159 N.E.2d 549
(1959).
All American courts agree that a witness may be impeached by a
showing that he was under the influence of narcotics 5 when he testified or when he observed the events concerning which he gives evidence.6 In the absence of a showing that the witness was influenced
by drugs at either of these times, a slight majority of jurisdictions
7
exclude testimony which shows the witness to be a drug addict.
2. Police officers followed the witness from defendant's home and arrested
him while he had a package of heroin in his possession. Following his arrest,
the witness remained in custody until the trial four months later. By his own
confession a "mainliner" (one who injects narcotics directly into his veins)
before this time, the witness denied at trial that he had received any drugs
whatever since a series of two injections given him the day after his arrest.
People v. Williams, 6 N.Y.2d 18, 22, 187 N.Y.S.2d 750, 753, 159 N.E.2d 549,
551 (1959).
3. Counsel specifically asked for an "opinion on the 'characteristics' and
'personality changes' of an addict, and on whether 'a person addicted to drugs
is-as a mainliner-can testify to facts in a normal manner.'" 6 N.Y.2d at 22,
187 N.Y.S.2d at 753, 159 N.E.2d at 551.
4. 5 App. Div. 2d 993, 173 N.Y.S.2d 296 (per curiam 1958).
5. See generally on the admission of evidence that a witness is a narcotics

addict, and of its influence on the powers of the witness 3 WHARToN,

CRImAL

§§ 905, 932 (12th ed. Anderson 1955); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 934 (3d
ed. 1940); Hale, Narcotics as Affecting Credibility, 16 So. CAL. L. REV. 333
(1943); Rossman, The Testimony of Drug Addicts, 3 ORE. L. REV. 81 (1924);
Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 848 (1957).
6. Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 568 (1914); People v. Crump, 5
Ill.2d 251, 125 N.E.2d 615 (1955); People v. Webster, 139 N.Y. 73, 34 N.E. 730,
734 (1893); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 157 Pa. Super. 366, 43 A.2d 400
(1945); State v. Smith, 103 Wash. 267, 174 Pac. 9, 10 (1918). These cases are
frequently susceptible of being interpreted as setting forth rules broader
than those actually enunciated. For instance, People v. Webster, supra, holds
that evidence of a habit of addiction may be given if it goes to prove that
the witness was under the influence of drugs at the time the event testified
to took place. It has been cited, however, for the more general proposition
that
the fact admissible.
of general People
addiction
expert"
testimony
to its
effectevidence
are bothofgenerally
v. and
Crump,
5 Ill.2d
251, 125asN.E.2d
(1955).
615,620
7. Kelly v. Maryland Cas. Co., 45 F.2d 782 (D.C.W.D. W. Va. (1929) (lengthy
discussion), aff'd on other grounds, 45 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1930); Williams v.
United States, 6 Indian Terr. 1, 88 S.W. 334, 337-38 (1904); Standard Oil Co.
v. Carter, 210 Ala. 572, 98 So. 575, 577 (1923); Webb v. People, 97 Colo. 262,
49 P.2d 381, 383 (1935); Nelson v. State, 99 Fla. 1032, 128 So. 1, 3 (1930);
Eldridge v. State, 27 Fla. 162, 9 So. 448, 453 (1891); Gordon v. Gilmer, 141
Ga. 347, 80 S.E. 1007, 1008 (1914); McDowell v. Preston, 26 Ga. 528, 535 (1858)
EVIDENCE
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Although few of these courts have explained their position precisely,
those which have done so normally justify it by suggesting that to
allow impeachment by a showing of general addiction might unduly
divert the attention of the court from more central issues. 8 One
court has refused to admit such evidence because of the confusion
existing in medical opinion.9 On the other hand, a vigorous minority
of courts regard evidence of general addiction as a proper basis for
impeachment. 10 This position is grounded either on the principle that
any evidence is admissible which shows an impairment of testimonial
powers," or on judicial notice of the supposed fact that addicts are
generally untruthful. 12 If a court is willing to permit a witness to be
impeached by showing that he is an addict, it is often also willing
to admit expert testimony concerning the effect addiction may have
on the witness' mental and moral characteristics. 13 Admission of
(leading case; basis for ruling not given); State v. King, 88 Minn. 175, 92
N.W. 965, 968 (1903); State v. Gleim, 17 Mont. 17, 41 Pac. 998, 1001 (1895);
Katleman v. State, 104 Neb. 62 175 N.W. 671 (1919); State v. Juliano, 103
N.J.L. 663, 138 Atl. 575, 582-83 ?1927); Franklin v. Franklin, 90 Tenn. 44, 4950, 16 S.W. 557, 558 (1891).
This view is somewhat analogous to the rule excluding evidence of recurrent instances of intoxication unless it is shown that the witness was
inebriated while observing the event sworn to, or while testifying. See, e.g.,
State v. Milosowitch, 42 Nev. 263, 175 Pac. 139, 141 (1918); State v. Edwards,
106 Ore. 58, 210 Pac. 1079, 1082 (1922); State v. Sorenson, 34 Wyo. 84, 241 Pac.
707 (1925). But see Winn v. Modern Woodmen of America, 138 Mo. App. 701,
119 S.W. 536, 539-40 (1909).
8. Webb v. People, 97 Colo. 262, 49 P.2d 381, 383 (1935) (witness' addiction
wholly unrelated to the issue being tried); State v. King, 88 Minn. 175, 92
N.W. 965, 968 (1903) (whether witness was an opium eater a collateral matter).
9. Kelly v. Maryland Cas. Co., supranote 7.
10. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. McKenna, 74 F.2d 155, 158-59 (8th Cir. 1934);
State v. Fong Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 158 Pac. 233, 236 (1916); People v, Hamby,
6 Ill.2d 559, 129 N.E.2d 746, 748 (1955) (witness' own admission of addiction
important on issue of credibility); State v. Prentice, 192 Iowa 207, 183 N.W.
411, 414-15 (1921); Markowitz v. Markowitz, 290 S.W. 119, 122 (Mo.App. 1927);
Effinger v. Effinger, 48 Nev. 209, 239 Pac. 801, 802-03 (1925); Beland v. State,
86 Tex. Crim. 365, 144 S.W. 281 (1912); Lankford v. Tombari, 35 Wash. 2d
412, 213 P.2d 627, 632 (1950); State v. Concannon, 25 Wash. 327, 65 Pac. 534,
537 (1901).
11. The Tombari decision, supra note 10, is based on this reasoning, and
cites 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 934 (3d ed. 1940), which expounds the principle.
12. State v. Fong Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 158 Pac. 233, 236 (1916) (habitual
users of opium notorious liars, citing WHARTON & STILLi, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE § 1111 (3d ed.)); Effinger v. Effinger, 48 Nev. 209, 239 Pac. 801, 803
(1925) (impairment of an addict's moral character an established fact of
medical research, citing Fong Loon decision supra); State v. Concannon, 25
Wash. 327, 65 Pac. 534, 537 (1901) (habitual use of opium known to utterly
deprave the addict). Contra, Weaver v. United States, 111 F.2d 603, 606-07

(8th Cir. 1940) (untruthfulness of addicts not so general that court would be

warranted in taking judicial notice thereof); Kelly v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
45 F.2d 782 (D.C.W.D. W.Va. 1922) (inspection of medical treatises and reports
reveals no consensus on addicts' veracity).
13. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. McKenna, 74 F.2d 155, 158-59 (8th Cir. 1934);
Markowitz v. Markowitz, 290 S.W. 119, 122 (Mo. App. 1927); Effinger v.
Effinger, 48 Nev. 209, 239 Pac. 801, 802-03 (1925); Anderson v. State, 65 Tex.
Crim. 365, 144 S.W. 281, 282 (1912); State v. Smith, 103 Wash. 267, 174 Pac.

9, 10 (1918) (expert testimony as to effect of drug on witness under influence

at time of event testified to).
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expert testimony is, however, an issue distinct from that of admitting

evidence of addiction, and not all courts agreeing on the latter also
agree on the former.14 Even in those jurisdictions which admit evidence of general addiction, there are holdings that a judge may not
charge that an addicted witness is untrustworthy. 5 In general, the
divergent views of the various jurisdictions, the reluctance of many
courts to explain their reasoning on these matters, and the conflict
existing in medical opinion 6 have left this area of the law in a
chaotic state.'7
In deciding that expert testimony on the truthfulness 8 of addicted
witnesses should not be admitted, the New York court stresses three
factors. First, the court points out that counsel may discredit the witness by calling attention to the fact of addiction and any attendant
disreputable behavior, 19 and thus he is not unduly circumscribed in
14. A recent California decision permitted addiction to be shown but
limited expert testimony to the effect of addition on memory and perception,
excluding testimony on veracity. People v. Bell, 138 Cal. App. 2d 7, 291 P.2d
150, 153 (1955). The court draws an analogy to the refusal of California
courts to admit expert testimony that a witness is mentally deficient. The
deficiency can be shown only by cross-examination.
15. Weaver v. United States, 111 F.2d 603 (8th Cir. 1940); Commonwealth
v. Farrell, 319 Pa. 441, 181 Atl. 217 (1935) (jury question); State v. Smith,
103 Wash. 267, 174 Pac. 9, 10 (1918). These cases should be read with
caution. A charge to the jury that an addict's testimony should be weighed
lightly amounts to a comment upon the evidence. The jurisdictions are
divided on whether a judge should be permitted to make comments generally,
and a number of states have enacted constitutional or statutory provisions to
forbid it. See 3 WHARTON, CRIMInAL EVIDENCE § 983 (12th ed. Anderson 1955).
A state constitutional provision forbidding a judge to comment upon matters
of fact may .explain the Smith case. WASH. CONST. art. 4, § 16. However, the
same provision apparently did not bother the court in State v. White, 10
Wash. 611, 39 Pac. 160 (1895) where a judge was permitted to warn a jury
that an addict's testimony is unreliable. The Pennsylvania decision is more
compelling, perhaps, since that state permits comments on evidence. See
Commonwealth v. Watts, 358 Pa. 92, 56 A.2d 81, 83 (1948). It is possible to
read the Weaver case as approving a charge on the weight to be given
an addict's testimony if proper foundation is made. Normally one would
suppose that courts taking judicial notice of the general untruthfulness of
addicts would permit such a charge, in the absence of a statute.
16. For illustrations of the division of medical opinion, see infra note 28.
17. The confusion is so pronounced that so highly respected a treatise as
WHARTON ON CRnVINAL EVIDENCE has been led to make the following two
statements at different points in the text: "Nor can evidence of the use of
opium be introduced to impair credibility, unless it is shown that the witness
was under the influence of opium when examined, or that his powers of
recollection were affected by the habit." 3 WHARTON, CRIINAL EVIDENCE §
905 (12th ed. Anderson 1955) (citing Mcdowell v. Preston, supra note 7). "It
is competent to show, for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a wit-

ness, that he is a habitual user of morphine." 3

WHARTON, CanvuiAL EVIDENCE

§ 932 (12th ed. Anderson 1955).
18. The dissenting justices feel that the majority errs in limiting its consideration to the issue of admitting testimony as to the witness' propensity
for veracity. Those in dissent believe that the record would justify considering the problem to be one of admitting expert testimony on the general effect
of addiction on mental and moral capacity. 6 N.Y.2d at 30, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 759,
159 N.E.2d at 556.
19. Certainly, counsel does still have considerable latitude within which
to impair a witness' standing. In the instant case, defense attorneys attacked
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his attack on the addicted witness. Secondly, it emphasizes that credibility is a collateral matter, rather than a principal issue.20 However,
the court makes it clear that this fact alone would not preclude the
admission of expert evidence if it were not for the third and most
significant barrier to this evidence: 2 1 discord among scientific experts.22 Since medical authorities seem unable to agree on the effects
of addiction, the court feels it would be unfair to allow the jury to
be swayed by the impact of a single expert opinion, giving only one
view on the problem.2 3 But if counsel should attempt to counteract
the opposition's showing by calling other experts holding a divergent
opinion, the trial might degenerate into the "frequently observed
spectacle of battle between expert witnesses. '24 Therefore, the court
concludes, it is best for the jury to perform its traditional function of
assessing credibility 25 without having been influenced or confused
by the varying opinions of individual experts.
It has been aptly said that exclusion of evidence "is particularly
desirable when the trier is unskilled... [and] where this evidence...
will confuse the issues."26 Certainly it is possible that the issues would
become clouded and the trier confused if the courts were to accept
contested medical opinion as evidence, and become ensnared in a
parade of contradictory witnesses. Furthermore, decisions based upon
the acceptance of scientific opinion not generally regarded as valid
27
by scientists themselves are unlikely to further the cause of justice.
this witness vigorously by pointing out an inconsistency in his statements,
cross-examining him at length as to his addiction and his personal history.
When summarizing their case before the jury, counsel referred to the witness
as "an 'ex-convict', a 'drug addict of the first class', a 'first class bum' a

'liar', 'cheat', 'thief', 'ex-procurer of men'" and implied that he aided the
police in "framing" the defendant. 6 N.Y.2d at 29, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 759, 159
N.E.2d at 556.
20. 6 N.Y.2d at 26, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 757, 159 N.E.2d at 554.
21. 6 N.Y.2d at 27, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 757, 159 N.E.2d at 555.
22. 6 N.Y.2d at 27-28, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 757-58, 159 N.E.2d at 555.
23. "Such expert testimony would unquestionably have great impact upon
a jury and, to some unknowable extent, replace their judgment by the

opinion of the expert. . . ." 6 N.Y.2d at 26-27, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 757, 159 N.E.2d
at 554.
24. MORGAx, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EviDENcE 320 (1954). Such a battle, it is
pointed out, not only consumes considerable time, but tends to confuse and
mislead jurors who are equally unfamiliar with the medical problem and
the legal principles involved. 6 N.Y.2d at 27, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 757-58, 159 N.E.2d
at 554.
25. "Credibility is, as the cases have repeated and insisted from the dawn
of the common law, a matter solely for the jury." 6 N.Y.2d at 26, 187 N.Y.S.2d
at 757, 159 N.E.2d at 554.
26. Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. Cni.
L. REv. 247, 256 (1937).
27. A demand for greater certainty before accepting scientific testimony on
truthfulness is nothing new for the courts. Complaining of the absence of
certainty in this crucial area, Professor Wigmore has queried: "[Wihere are
the practical psychological tests, which will detect specifically the memoryfailure and the lie on the witness stand? There must first be proof of general
scientific recognition that they are valid and feasible." 3 WIGMORE, EVWD.NCE
§ 875 (3d ed. 1940). Because the familiar polygraph (lie detector) examina-

19601

RECENT CASES

Even cursory research reveals considerable variance of opinion on
the relation of addiction to truthfulness.2 Therefore, the reluctance of
tion has not yet achieved general scientific acceptance as a reliable means
of ascertaining truth or falsehood, the vast majority of courts reject its
results. People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P.2d 70, cert. denied 342
U.S. 888 (1950); State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947); State v.
Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43, (1945); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37
N.W.2d 593 (1949). See Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1952), which discusses a
number of cases on polygraph tests and also treats the rejection of "truth
serum" and hypnosis tests.
28. For an excellent comprehensive bibliography on various problems related to drug addiction and its effect on the mind and character, see the
topical listing of books and articles which is appended to DE RoPP, DRUGS AND
THE MIN (1957). Ranging briefly through materials on the subject, one can
find a number of statements which would support the Fong Loon and
Concannon approach. E.g., speaking of a series of reports describing the
case history of an addict, it has been said: "These reports show the typical
reaction of the drug addict who is unwilling, or perhaps unable, to face
squarely the facts of his addiction. Here we find the usual lying, evasion,
and rationalization with which all who deal with drug addicts are familiar."
YOST, THE BANE OF DRUG ADDICTION 39 (1954). (In the opening pages of his
book, however, Yost is careful to point out that generalizations as to addicts
are dangerous.) Another source proclaims: "'While the marihuana habit
leads to physical wreckage and mental decay, its effects upon character and
morality are even more devastating. The victim frequently undergoes such
degeneracy that he will' lie and steal without scruple; he becomes utterly
untrustworthy . . . . INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

MARIHUANA OR INDIAN HEMP AND ITS PREPARATIONS (1936), quoted in MAYOR'S
COMMITTEE ON MARIHUANA, THE MARIHUANA PROBLEM IN THE CITY OF NEW
YORK 4 (1944). "The fully developed morphine addict is not only incapable
of heroic acts; his altruistic or moral sense is impaired in all relations."
WILLAMS, DRUGS AGAINST MEN 146 (1935). The addict "will lie, steal, beg,
cheat or do anything to get the coveted drug .

. .

. He becomes infinitely

crafty and utterly untrustworthy." RIcE & HARGER, EFFECTS OF ALCOHOLIC
DRINs, TOBACCO, SEDATnrEs, NARcOTIcS 274 (1949). Cf. ANSLINGER & TOMPKInS,
THE TRAFFIc IN NARcOTIcs 225 (1953).
On the other hand, some noted authorities are equally convinced that
addicts cannot be regarded as generally unreliable. "It will be found upon
careful examination that they are average individuals in their mental and
moral fundamentals. Among them are many men and women of high ideals
and worthy accomplishments." BISHOP, THE NARCOTIC DRUG PROBLEM 3 (1920).
Similar but more lengthy statements of like nature appear on pages 17, 23 and
24 of this book. 'With the exception of this area [drug addiction] the addict
shows great moral indignation at outrages committed in society .... "
NYSWANDER, THE DRUG ADDICT AS A PATIENT 62 (1956). "'The change produced in mature individuals [by the drug habit] is usually so slight that it
cannot be demonstrated or cannot be classed as "moral deterioration."' .
DE RoPP, DRUGS AND THE MIND 148 (1957), quoting Dr. Lawrence Kolb. "But
the concept of what opiate addiction actually involves has become very
gravely distorted in the public mind .

.

.

. The narcotics addict is not a

criminal, though the criminal may become a narcotics addict. Heroin and
morphine do not necessarily destroy life or impair intellect." Id. at 149. Like
statements can be found in NOYES & KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 567
(1958); MAURER & VOGEL, NARCOTICS AND NARCOTIC ADDICTION 238 (1955);
Felix, An Appraisal of the Personality Types of the Addict, 100 AMERICAN
J. OF PSYCHIATRY 462 (1944).
A most striking illustration of the disagreement concerning the effects and
treatment of addiction is a recent publication of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,

COMMENTS

ON NARCOTIC

DRUGS:

INTERIM REPORT OF THE JOINT

COMMITTEE OF THE ABA AND THE AMA ON NARCOTIC DRUGS (1958). This booklet is a vigorous criticism of conclusions concerning the narcotic problem
announced by the ABA-AMA Joint Committee. Topically arranged, with
articles by a number of legal and medical authorities selected by Federal
Narcotics Commissioner Anslinger, the booklet should be read in its entirety
to be fully understood. Especially relevant to the instant discussion are pages
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the New York court to accept testimony from a physician that drug

addicts are unreliable per se is justifiable. The skilled attorney will
not be unduly hampered by this exclusion. If addiction has in fact
led the witness into a pattern of conduct that would render him unworthy of belief, counsel will doubtless be able to impeach him on
this ground.
72-94, where the ideas of Dr. Lawrence Kolb, and the so-called "Lindesmith-Kolb" school of thought are subjected to severe criticism, and pages
156-57 which deplore the ABA-AMA report for minimizing the effects of
addiction.
In order to obtain current opinion from medical workers who are daily
confronted with addicts, questionnaires were sent by the Vanderbilt Law
Review to the staffs of the United States Public Health Service hospitals for
treatment of narcotics patients at Fort Worth, Texas and Lexington, Kentucky. These forms questioned staff members as to their opinions on the
effect of addiction on moral character. Without attempting to present a
single definitive statement of the opinion of those replying, the following
results from examination of the returned questionnaires can be stated:
(1) The majority of those replying consider addicts capable of normally
accurate observation of external events, unless: (a) the addict was grossly
intoxicated at the time; or (b) was experiencing a deep-set emotional problem of the type which might affect perception; or (c) was experiencing
withdrawal symptoms during the event.
(2) Similarly, most of those replying regarded the addict's powers of
recollection to be equal to or only slightly inferior to those of the non-addict.
(3) There was unanimous disapproval of the following statements: "The
habitual use of opium ...

is known to utterly deprave the victim of its use,

and render him unworthy of belief." (Taken from State v. Concannon, 25

Wash. 327, 65 Pac. 534, 537 (1901)) "Habitual users of opium, or other like
narcotics, become notorious liars. The habit of lying comes doubtless from
the fact that the users of those narcotics pass the greater part of their lives

in an unreal world, and thus become unable to distinguish between images
and facts, between illusions and realities." (Taken from State v. Fong Loon,
29 Idaho 248, 158 Pac. 233, 236 (1916)).
(4) There was a sizable minority, including 3 of the 5 psychiatrists replying, who approved the following statement: "There is at present so considerable a divergence of opinion on the issue of whether an addict is
untrustworthy and untruthful that no accurate statement can be made which
would represent a consensus of authority on the issue." This is the general
rationale of the instant case.
(5) In general, the majority of medical personnel who expressed a personal opinion on the propensity of the addict to lie indicate this: The addict
while he may have fewer inhibitions against lying than the non-addict will
be truthful or not for much the same reasons as other persons. He should
not be thought of as untrustworthy simply because of his addiction, but only
on the basis of the same individual criteria applicable to any other witness.
The following sampling of individual replies should reveal something of the
range of answers: "An addict, like other persons of socially deviant behavior, would lie in order to insure or to obtain a supply of his drugs."
In reply to a request for personal opinion on the propensity of addicts to
lie, one simply stated: "Generalizations are not justified."
"The type of person who becomes addicted has a propensity for lying-I
doubt whether significant increase occurs after addiction, except that there
is more opportunity for gainful lying (to get narcotics)." "The moral character of the addict is not impaired, per se, by the use of drugs, but the addict
may feel compelled to steal or rob in order to obtain money to support his
habit."
In answer to the question: Is the moral character of the addict generally
impaired by his use of the drug? one replied: "Yes, to the extent that control
of function is related to drug seeking motivation; and subsequently moral
standards commensurate with this distorted society."
"Some addicts lie, some volunteer information that most people would
lie about. I don't think that use of the drug makes them any less capable
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FEDERAL RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE-DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS-RIGHT OF COUNTERCLAIMING DEFENDANT
TO TRIAL BY JURY
Fox West Coast Theatres, Inc., instituted an action' in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California for a
declaratory judgment that a grant of clearance2 between its theatres
and those of the defendant, Beacon Theatres, Inc., was not in violation
of the antitrust laws and for an injunction pendente lite restraining
defendant from instituting any action against the plaintiff under the
antitrust laws. Defendant filed a counterclaim asserting a violation
of the antitrust laws and asking for treble damages. The court rejected defendant's demand for a jury trial of the factual issues
involved and ordered that the issues raised by the complaint, being
essentially equitable, be tried to the court prior to determination by
a jury of the issues presented by the counterclaim. Defendant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the
district court to vacate this order. This petition was denied.3 Certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court was granted because the "'maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body.., occupies so firm a place
in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the
right . ..

should be scrutinized with utmost care.'"4 Held, reversed.

A claim formerly cognizable in equity because of inadequacy of a
of telling the truth. They are probably no more or less truthful than are
many other behavior types."
From the most extended statement made comes this comment: "I can well
understand that [my] position will not provide any 'rules-of-thumb' which
may be applied easily. Scientific investigation might establish various conditions under which high reliability of statement could be expected, just as
such inquiry might be made of non-addicts' statements. A mean or average
reliability might then be estimated for various classes of individuals. While
such an investigation might help in understanding motivations, it would be
of little aid in court, since here reliability is an individual matter."
All the answers given above were referring to the addict as a person who
has used heroin or a like drug for a period of two years or more. The most
compelling conclusion to which one is driven on examining all the replies is
that those who are continually confronted by the addicts are overwhelmingly
unwilling to offer any concrete generalizations. This being true, the courts
should hardly feel any more willing to give its sanction to a single medical
opinion.
1. Fox West Coast Theatres, Inc., hereinafter called "Fox," alleged in
substance that Beacon Theatres, Inc., hereinafter called "Beacon," had infringed upon its right to negotiate for exclusive first-run contracts by using
threats of antitrust actions to coerce distributors not to grant clearance to
Fox. This is alleged to be an interference with defendant's property right
for which it has no adequate remedy at law, the theory being that Fox would
have to await a suit by Beacon in order to determine whether a grant of
clearance to Fox was a violation of the antitrust laws.
2. The term "clearance" in the motion picture industry refers to a
specified period of time during which no theater in a particular area is permitted to show a film except that theatre which is granted this clearance.
3. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1958).
4. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959).
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legal remedy is, in the absence of unusual circumstances, 5 converted
to a legal claim by reason of the adequate remedies afforded by the
Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules and is therefore
triable of right by a jury. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S.
500 (1959).
The seventh amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury as
it existed at common law. Since at common law there was no right
to a jury trial in courts of equity, the orthodox view is that the
Constitution confers no such right.6 The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure neither expand nor contract this right.1 Hence, under the
present fused system, a decision as to the right of jury trial depends
upon whether the action was formerly cognizable at law or in equity.
If both equitable and legal issues are presented in one controversy,
a right to a jury trial exists as to the legal issues only.8 The court
is given discretion as to the order of trial in such a case.9 The Declaratory Judgment Act merely provides a new statutory remedy.10 This
remedy is neither legal nor equitable, and the courts have generally
held that the right to a jury trial is determined by the legal or
equitable nature of the context in which the issues are presented.11
The act, in other words, effects no change in procedure existing at the
time of its enactment.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court did not directly overturn
the foregoing principles. Fox's petition, as conceded by the Court,
stated a claim "traditionally" cognizable in equity-wrongful inter12
ference with a property right and inadequacy of legal remedy.
This would seem to warrant the conclusion that the issues thus raised
5. The Court said that, because of the flexibility of the Federal Rules, it
could not anticipate any circumstances in which the legal remedy would be
inadequate. 359 U.S. at 510, 511.
6. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); Barton v. Barbour, 104
U.S. 126 (1881); Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 253 (1856).

7. FED. R. Civ. P. 38, 39; Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 62
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777 (1943); Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec.

Mfg. Co., 7 F.R.D. 343 (E.D.N.Y. 1947); Bynum v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 7

F.R.D. 585 (E.D.S.C. 1947); Arnstein v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
3 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).

8. To hold that by joining equitable and legal causes of action, or by interposing a legal counterclaim, a party waives his right to trial by jury, would be
to deprive a party of a right to jury trial in view of the fact that he is forced,
in some instances, to plead a cause of action or a counterclaim in that particular case or lose it completely. Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1948);
FED. R. Crv. P. 13; 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 2.02(6) (2d ed. 1948); 5 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE I 38.13, 38.14 (2d ed. 1951). Even where such pleading is
permitted rather than required, to hold otherwise would be contrary to the
spirit of the Federal Rules. Cf. Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N.Y.
391, 115 N.E. 993 (1917).

9. FED. R. Civ. P. 42 (b).
10. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1959); FED. R. CIV.
P. 57.
11. BORcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 399-403 (2d ed. 1941); 5 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE f[ 38.29 (2d ed. 1951).
12. Supra note 1.
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by the complaint were equitable and therefore triable by the court;
and, if the trial judge so decided, 13 in advance of the legal issues raised
by the counterclaim. But the Court then decided that the Federal
Rules and the Declaratory Judgment Act had the effect of giving
Fox an adequate remedy at law when Beacon pleaded his counterclaim, and therefore the situation is identical to that which would
have existed had Beacon brought its legal action first. Thus it was not
decided that there is a right to trial by jury of equitable issues, but
rather that, because of the Federal Rules and Declaratory Judgment
Act, equitable issues will rarely be presented when an equitable
action is met by a legal counterclaim.
Generally, in a case of this type, the same result could be reached
without such a drastic departure from traditional theory. If a declaratory judgment proceeding is actually an attempt to circumvent a
jury trial by bringing an action before the defendent-a race to the
court house, in other words-the basic issue will still be that raised
by the counterclaim, it being the basis of the actual controversy.' 4
This would be true even though plaintiff requested an injunction or
other incidental relief. However, where, as here, the plaintiff alleges
meritorious grounds for equitable relief, the basic issue must be
termed equitable even though this issue is also raised by the counterclaim. This being true, the trial judge exercised his discretion in the
manner provided by the Federal Rules 15 when he ordered trial of the
equitable issues raised by the complaint in advance of the legal issues
raised by petitioner's counterclaim. The "basic issue" theory being
inapplicable, the Court granted petitioner a jury trial by declaring
that the modem procedure provided an adequate remedy at law. 16
In theory, at least, this holding seems clearly erroneous in two
respects. First of all, the Federal Rules expand neither substantive
law nor the right to trial by jury. Yet this decision attributes to them
that effect. Secondly, if this holding is based upon the idea that the
requirement of a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction
makes Fox's legal remedy adequate, 17 the Court overlooks the hereto13. FED. R. Civ. P. 42 (b), 57.
14. Dickinson v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 147 F.2d 396 (9th
Cir. 1945); 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 38.16, 38.29 (2d ed. 1951).

15. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b), 57.
16. Some courts have enlarged the right to jury trial by saying that in
cases where legal and equitable issues are presented, the trial judge is very
narrowly restricted in exercising his discretion as to the order of trial as
provided by the Federal Rules. The theory behind such a policy is that the
Constitution guarantees a jury trial but not a trial to the court, and therefore
every effort should be made to protect a jury trial. If a common issue is tried
first by the court, the jury may thereby be precluded from considering it on
principles of collateral estoppel. See Leimer v. Woods, 196 F.2d 828 (8th Cir.
1952). Other courts give the trial judge a wide discretion, as provided by
Rule 42(b). E.g., Tanimura v. United States, 195 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1952);

Orenstein v. United States, 191 F.2d 184 (lst Cir. 1951).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (a).
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fore settled proposition that "equitable jurisdiction existing at the filing of a bill is not destroyed because an adequate legal remedy may
u8
have become available thereafter.'
In spite of its novelty and departure from precedent, this case may
well be approved by some practitioners in the federal courts in that it
prevents a possible circumvention of a jury trial by means of an
ingenious use of declaratory judgment proceedings and affords a
prompt recourse to litigation. Approval or disapproval must necessarily depend upon one's social philosophy as to the merits of the
jury system and the desirability of its expansion. Whether the orthodox practice should be abandoned is a subject upon which honest men
differ. All agree that it is not perfect. It is often asserted that juries
actually change the law, although ostensibly leaving it unaltered;
that they are expensive; that they are the cause for the backlog of
cases on the calendars of many courts. Advocates of the jury system
answer that it is a necessary means of injecting adaptability into a
sometimes rigid framework of legal rules, or that the combination of
judge and jury is the best available method of determining truth in
a lawsuit. Thus the argument rages on. One thing remains clear,
however-right to trial by jury cannot be constitutionally restricted.
The question of whether it should be expanded by opinions such as
Beacon depends upon a decision as to the desirability of the jury
system.

PROFESSION OF LAW-UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICECORPORATION MAY ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES
CONSTITUTING PRACTICE OF LAW IF SUCH ACTIVITIES
ARE INCIDENTAL TO ITS PRINCIPAL BUSINESS
Plaintiff bar association sought an injunction' to restrain defendant
title guaranty companies 2 from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. The alleged practices consisted of preparing legal instruments and giving advice in connection therewith, of holding itself
18. American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 215 (1937).
1. Although a quo warranto action is frequently used to question a corporation's right to practice law, it is not the exclusive remedy, and an injunction
is available as a proper proceeding. Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934); Depew v. Wichita Retail Credit
Ass'n, 141 Kan. 481, 42 P.2d 214 (1935); Stewart Abstract Co. v. Judicial
Comm'n, 131 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). Contra, Birmingham Bar
Ass'n v. Phillips & Marsh, 239 Ala. 650, 196 So. 725 (1940) (quo warranto is
the exclusive remedy for determining encroachments upon the practice of

law).
2. The suit was brought against Union Planters Title Guaranty Company,
Commerce Title Guaranty Company and Mid-South Title Company. While

the case was pending in the lower court, the Union Planters Title Guaranty
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out as performing legal services, and of serving as a conduit for channeling legal business to both staff and independent attorneys. Defendant denied both preparing the instruments and giving legal
advice. In the alternative defendant pleaded that even if it had
followed an improper procedure, an injunction should not be issued
since the public interest was best served by permitting the same
attorney who examined the title to prepare the instruments, and also
since the defendant was the "real party in interest" it was entitled
to prepare the documents. Considering the case as one of first impression in Tennessee, the chancellor granted the injunction. 3 The Court
of Appeals of Tennessee, held, reversed. While some of the activities
of the defendant constitute the "practice of law" or the doing of "law
business," they are all legitimately incidental to the main or principal
business of defendant, which is title insurance; and consequently,
they should not be adjudged to constitute the unlawful practice of
law, nor enjoined as such. Bar Ass'n of Tennessee v. Union Planters
Title Guar. Co., 326 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. App. 1959), cert. denied, (Tenn.
Sup. Ct., June 5, 1959).
The right to practice law, whether designated a property right or
a franchise, 4 is limited to those persons 5 who have complied with the
Company disposed of its assets to the Commerce Title Company and discontinued its former activities. The bill was therefore dismissed by consent as
to the Union Planters Title Guaranty Company. The chancellor also dismissed
the bill as to the defendant Commerce Title Guaranty Company since it did
not engage directly in any of the acts complained of. Prior to the filing of
the bill, Mid-South and Commerce Title entered into a contract for twentyfive years, whereby Mid-South became the exclusive agent for Commerce
Title in the issuance of title policies. The plaintiff bar association argued
that any relief to which it was entitled should be directed against both
defendants because of their relationship of principle and agent. The court of
appeals, however, felt that the case was complicated enough without involving
what it viewed to be an unnecessary party; and the suit as to Commerce
Title was therefore dismissed-Mid-South remaining as the only defendant.
3. The chancellor thereby enjoined the defendant Mid-South Title Company from "Preparation of conveyancing or related instruments, and/or
giving of legal advice relative thereto, when such acts are performed for,
or on behalf of, parties to a real estate transaction, by any person, lawyer
or other, in the salaried employment of the defendant, and/or when performed in its office or place of business, whether such acts are compensated
for by defendant corporation, by the parties to the transaction or are uncompensated." 326 S.W.2d at 769.
4. Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass'n, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E.
577 (1931) (valuable right in the nature of a property right or franchise);
State v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n, 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S.W.2d 918 (1931) (in
the nature of a franchise from the state, conferred only for merit).
5. The rigid requirements imposed by the courts upon those who seek permission to practice law can only be met by a human being. In re Co-operative
Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910). Artificial creations such as corporations or associations cannot meet these prerequisites and therefore cannot engage in the practice of law. State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.,
145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958). Nor can they hire lawyers to carry on the
business of practicing law for them. People v. California Protective Corp., 76
Cal. App. 354, 244 Pac. 1089 (1926).
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state's requisites for obtaining a license. 6 Licensing requirements are
imposed to protect the public from those who are unqualified and
unskilled in giving legal service and advice, and are not designed to
eliminate competition7 In order to determine whether specific acts
of a layman or a corporation constitute the unauthorized practice
of law, the courts are compelled first of all to determine what activities constitute "the practice of law," and then they must decide
whether or not the accused is "authorized" to do these acts. While
the oft-defined8 term "the practice of law" may not be capable of any
exact definition, 9 the courts have used several "tests"'1 to determine
whether the activities are unauthorized. Although certain activities
may actually be within the scope of what is traditionally thought of as
being "the practice of law," where a party has "substantial interest"
in the subject matter so that he may be said to be acting for himself,
his performance of services will not be enjoined.'1 The preparation of
legal instruments or the rendition of services usually performed by
an attorney may be permissible if "incidental" to the layman's regular
business. 12 Also, if no "compensation" is received, certain services
6. See Otterbourg, A Study of Unauthorized Practice of Law, UNAUTIORIZED
NEWS (sp. issue, Sept. 1951) for a complete listing of state statutes

PRACTICE

which prohibit the unauthorized practice of law. The relevant Tennessee
statutes are TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 29-302 to -303 (1956).
7. Bump v. Barnett, 235 Iowa 308, 16 N.W.2d 579 (1944); New Jersey State
Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mtg. Ass'n, 22 N.J. 184, 123 A.2d 498 (1956); Auerbacher v. Wood, 142 N.J.Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948).
8. See 33 WORDS & PHRASES, The Practice of Law 193-208 (1940); Practicing
Law, id. at 226-29. For a discussion of what constitutes the practice of law,
see Annots., 151 A.L.R. 781 (1944), 125 A.L.R. 1173 (1940), 111 A.L.R. 19
(1937).
9. Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943); Cowern v.
Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940).

10. For a complete listing of these "tests" or "theories" and for an extensive

compilation of source material see AMERICAN
PRACTICE SOURCE BOOK (Sp. project 1958).

BAR FOUNDATION,

UNAUTHORIZED

11. The "substantial interest" theory seems to be derived from the idea
that a person may be his own lawyer. The problem arises in attempting to
determine just how far the courts are going to permit this idea to be carried.
See Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423, 312 P.2d 1011 (1957)
(corporation lending money prepared notes, deeds of trust, and mortgages to
secure notes); Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1954)
(title insurance company effecting transfer of title in order to issue policy).
The interest of the lay party was held to be insufficient in the following cases:
Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408 (1954)
(bank acting as trustee); Carter v. Brien, 309 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1956) (pecuniary interest of county court clerk insufficient to permit drawing of wills);
In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill.2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958)
(interest of railway union in claims of its members).
12. Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1954) (title insurance company may use standard form conveyances to accomplish insurable
title); Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69
N.W.2d 713 (1955) (conveyancing proper incident to real estate brokerage).
The theory was rejected in the cases following: Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn:
468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951)

(such a rule ignores the interest to the public);

Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar, 326 P.2d 408 (Nev. 1958) (question should be whether services are necessary rather than incidental).
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performed in connection with a regular occupation may be allowed.
Although some legal services may be condoned when incidental to a
layman's business, if these involve "complex questions of law" they
are wholly within the practice of law and consequently forbidden to
the layman. 14 In addition to using these various technical justifications
for engaging in the practice of law, the defendant frequently has attempted to justify his acts on a policy basis by contending that he
has become a "specialist" in his field and therefore that the public is
aided by his services which are alleged to be more expert in character
and lower in cost than those obtainable from an attorney.15 It has
been contended that certain activities should be permissible because
they have "customarily" been performed by laymen.16 "Convenience
to the public" has also been combined as a defense with the previous
1

justification of "custom."'

After rejecting the defenses of "no compensation"' 8 and "public
13. Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935); Cowern v.
Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940) (brokers allowed to draft instruments without compensation); Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N.J.Eq. 599, 53 A.2d
800 (1947) (no separate charge allowable with incidental legal advice);
Haverty Furniture Co. v. Foust, 174 Tenn. 203, 124 S.W.2d 694 (1939) (mere
filling in of blanks on writ of replevin by corporation's credit manager without receiving any valuable consideration did not violate statute regulating
practice of law).. Contra, Grievance Comm. v. Coryell, 190 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1945) (wrong legal advice equally injurious whether paid for or
not); Grievance Comm. v. Dean, 190 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) (compensation does not determine classification).
14. Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951) (layman enjoined from preparing tax return requiring resolution of complex question);
In re Bercu, 273 App. Div. 524, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1948), aji'd, 299 N.Y. 728, 87
N.E.2d 451 (1949) (accountant advising on tax questions). The test of complexity of subject matter was rejected in Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v.
State Bar, 326 P.2d 408 (Nev. 1958) on the ground that the exercise of judgment by the company rather than the simplicity or complexity of the service
should determine whether the specific acts were the practice of law. See
People v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666 (1919) for a
variation of the "complexity" theory which was repudiated in a famous statement by Pound, J. (concurring opinion).
15. Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951); State ex rel.
Johnson v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381 (1941) (qualifying as an expert
insufficient to practice law without a license).
16. Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312
P.2d 998 (1957); Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943);
People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919) (judicial notice taken of
widespread custom of lay practices).
17. Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312
P.2d 998 (1957); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932, 130 S.W.2d 945
(1939).
18. The court was not impressed by defendant's offer to furnish the instruments and advice without charge. Such an offer was held to be 'kidding the
public" since it would probably require an increase in title premiums. The
court pointed out that the defendant could compensate its own attorneys for
the loss of instrument fees by adjusting their salaries. Defendant might also
pay the outside attorneys a fiat fee and thereby offer its services as being free
of charge. Yet the total effect of such an offer was held to be merely a
"come-on" to induce the prospective customers to transact other business
which would render sufficient profit to the defendant to pay it to use such an
incentive. 326 S.W.2d at 777. Accord, Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance
Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944).
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economy,"' 9 the Tennessee court approached the problem by examining the public interest involved. It was felt that the same principle
involved in a statute20 permitting real estate brokers to draft certain
legal documents should apply equally to title guaranty companies, inasmuch as the statute is an indication of the public policy of Tennessee. Decisions from other jurisdictions 2' were used as further
evidence to fortify the court's conception of the basic issue of public
interest; but the cases cited do not seem to be authority for the ultimate conclusions reached by the Tennessee court.p It appears that
the court in the instant case combined the frequently-used defenses
of "substantial interest"23 and "incidental to business" 24 with the
determining issue of "public interest" to arrive at an unusual result.
The instant case and a recent Colorado decision2 stand alone in
holding that corporations and laymen, respectively, may under cer19. The court failed to accept defendant's plea that preparation of instru-

ments by staff attorneys was more economical and that therefore the public
was better served. The profits and commissions made by defendant were
not based on economy to the public, but upon what would be fair compensation for its services. 326 S.W.2d at 775.
20.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-1325

(1956)

provides: "Any person (real estate

broker) licensed hereunder that engages in drawing any legal document other
than contracts to option, buy, sell, or lease, real property, may have his or her
license revoked or suspended as provided in this chapter." The majority of
the court interpreted this section as preserving the right to real estate brokers
to draw legal documents if such documents pertain to real property. The
dissent, however, did not so construe § 62-1325. Avery, J., felt that the above
statutory provision only gives the real estate broker the right to prepare
contracts which allow him to bind his client "to option, buy, sell, or lease,
real property." The preparation of the deeds and other documents necessary
for compliance with the executed contract which the broker draws are, in his
opinion, matters which must be done either by a lawyer or by the client himself. The majority opinion was viewed as having given no effect to the preposition "to" immediately following the word "contracts."
21. Since the instant case is one of first impression in Tennessee, the court
relied on the following cases to show what the public policy of other jurisdictions has been in cases of this character: State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank
& Trust Co., 20 Conn. Supp. 248, 131 A.2d 646 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Cooperman v.
West Coast Title Co., 75 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1954); Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn.
642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940); Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N.J.Eq. 599, 53 A.2d 800
(1947), afT'd, 142 N.J.Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948).
22. No decision quoted from in the majority opinion, supra note 21, reached
the conclusion that the alleged unauthorized acts would be permissible even
though they constituted the "practice of law." In the two title guaranty cases
cited: La Brum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948);
Cooperman v. West Coast Title Guar. Co., 75 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1954), the acts
complained of were construed as not being "the practice of law." In the prior
case, a Pennsylvania statute pertaining to title insurance companies was
interpreted as authorizing the acts complained of. In the latter case, there
was no reference to any statute whatsoever which defined "the practice of
law." For a discussion of the distinguishing facts of the "supporting" decisions
cited by the majority, see 326 S.W.2d 767, 785-87 (dissenting opinion).
23. See note 10 supra.
24. See note 11 supra.
25. In the case of Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135
Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957), the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the
preparation of instruments by real estate brokers in transactions which were
incidental to their brokerage business was not unlawful even though it constituted the practice of law.
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tain circumstances perform services which are designated as constituting the practice of law. The facts of the present case present even
less of a basis for such a holding than did the Colorado case, for the
practical necessity of having someone do the legal work in counties
26
where no lawyers were available, as was the situation in Colorado,
is entirely absent in the Tennessee decision.
While the court could have reached the same result by declaring
' 7
that defendant's activities were not "the practice of law,"2 it chose
to expressly label them as constituting "the practice of law" or the
28
doing of "law business." As was pointed out in a forceful dissent,
such a holding is in direct conflict with a Tennessee statute which requires a license to practice law.29 It seems strange also, that after
holding that the defendant corporation drafted the instruments, the
court never mentioned the generally accepted view that a corporation
may not practice law.30 The majority opinion correctly states that
the controlling factor in determining the case should be the public
interest; 31 but having said this, it seems that their conclusion is shortsighted.32 Although the usual danger of the unauthorized person be26. In three counties in Colorado there are no lawyers; in each of ten other
counties there is only one lawyer; and in each of seven other counties there
are only two attorneys. Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n,
supra note 25, 312 P.2d at 1007.

27. The court could have held that the activities of defendant were not the

"practice of law" since the judicial department is the sole arbiter of what
constitutes the practice of law. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bar v. Earley,
109 S.E.2d 420 (W.Va. 1959).
28. 326 S.W.2d at 788 (Avery, J. dissenting).
29. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-303 (1956) provides: "No person shall engage in
the 'practice of law' or do 'law business,' or both . . . unless he shall have
been duly licensed therefor...."

30. See note 5 supra. Accord, State v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n, 163 Tenn.

450, 43 S.W.2d 918 (1931) (interpreting TENN. CODE ANm. § 29-108 (1956)).
31. 326 S.W.2d at 778, where the court states: "[W]e should consider of
primary importance the effect which it (the ruling of the court on the question presented by this case) will have in protecting the rights and interests
of the public, rather than the benefits which may accrue to lawyers of this
State...
32. In holding that the defendant corporation would be permitted to carry
on these alleged unauthorized activities, the court made no ruling which required that licensed attorneys should continue to be used by the defendant
in drafting the instruments and giving advice thereto. This would imply
that so long as the activities are "incidental to the principal business of guaranteeing titles" they could be performed for the corporation by any of its lay
employees. But even if the court's ruling was restricted to activities performed
by licensed attorneys employed by the defendant corporation, such a ruling
violates the ethical principle that the attorney-client relationship must remain
an individual and impersonal one. AmiEcAN BAR Ass'N, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHcs No. 35 (1933). The fact that the public is not served when
attorneys do not act in an impersonal and individual capacity is clearly demonstrated in In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 112d 391, 150 N.E.2d
163 (1958) where the court felt that the interest of injured trainmen and
the representatives of the deceased trainmen in receiving legal advice at
reasonable fees (the Brotherhood established its legal aid department

whereby regional counsel were paid a percentage, fixed by the Brotherhood,
of the judgment or settlement recovered; and in return all expenses in connection with the action were paid by the attorneys) was insufficient to over-
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ing incompetent is not present here,33 the court fails to recognize the
very real danger of a conflict of interest. 34 The Tennessee court
viewed an absence of any statutory provision allowing title insurance
companies to draft certain legal documents as indicating that the
public policy of Tennessee required that a statute providing such a
right to real estate brokers, should, by analogy, be applied to title
guaranty companies.3 5 It is submitted that by failing to expressly

ride the principles which govern the legal profession in their relations with
clients. Where the person performing legal services is not an attorney, the
public is not given the protection of court supervision. Gardner v. Conway,
234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951) (protection of the public set at naught
where laymen, who are not subject to court supervision, are permitted to
practice law).
33. The alleged unauthorized activities in the instant case were performed
by licensed attorneys, and their ability was not questioned. The following
cases are illustrative of areas where laymen, attempting to perform legal
services, have proved to be incompetent: Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647,
320 P.2d 16 (1958) (will prepared by notary not admitted to probate); L. B.
Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell, 39 Cal.2d 56, 244 P.2d 385 (1952) (penalty assessed against client where C.P.A. was negligent in filing tax return); Esposito
v. Esposito, 294 N.Y. 737, 61 N.E.2d 521 (1945) (deed prepared by real estate
broker set aside). See Houck, Drafting of Real Estate Instruments: The Problem From the Standpoint of the Bar, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 66 (1938).
34. In the instant case the plaintiff bar association alleged that when staff
attorneys represent the parties to a real estate transaction, as well as their
employer-guaranty company, a situation arises where the interests of the

parties could be adverse. See

AMERIcAN BAR Ass'N, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL

ETIcs No. 6 (1908). In such circumstances the interests of defendant would
be paramount since defendant controls the services of its lawyers in violation
of Canon 35, supra note 32. The reply of the court to plaintiff's complaint was
as follows: "Actually, there isn't much possibility of adverse interest appearing in these transactions, but if they did, defendant would no doubt insist that
the parties obtain separate counsel." 326 S.W.2d at 774. It would seem from
the very nature of the transaction that not only might an adverse interest
appear, but that there actually exists a conflicting interest between the client
and the defendant title guaranty company. The desire of the client is to
obtain a marketable title, guaranteed by a policy of insurance, whereby any
possible defect would be covered by his policy. The interest of the defendant
guaranty company is to have a perfect title to insure or to except from the
policy those defects which subsequently might cause liability to arise. Thus it
would seem that the interests of the client and the defendant insurance company do not coincide. A situation similar to that in the instant case arose in
Texas in San Antonio Bar Ass'n v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 156 Tex. 7,
291 S.W.2d 697 (1956) where the title company was intimately affiliated with
a firm of lawyers who did little practice of any kind except for the services
rendered to the defendant abstract and title company. The relationship was
described as follows: "[The attorneys] were in reality acting as agents for the
corporation-thinking of themselves as primarily working for it, and as they
themselves largely admitted, not thinking of themselves as 'representing' the
individual 'clients' concerned." 291 S.W.2d at 702. The opinion of the Court
of Civil Appeals of Texas in the same case recognized that the first loyalty
of the attorneys was to the title company. Although no damage or loss was
sustained by any party, it was pointed out that there were some instances in
which an exception as to the liability of the title company concerning area
and boundary were inserted in the title insurance policy. Guardian Abstract
& Title Co. v. San Antonio Bar Ass'n, 278 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
This certainly points to a present conflict of interest and demonstrates clearly
that the client in such a situation is in need of independent legal advice.
35. "In Tennessee, the right of real estate brokers to draw documents appertaining to the business of real estate brokers is expressly preserved by statute,
which, to some extent, in our opinion, indicates what the public policy of
Tennessee should be in the instant case." 326 S.W.2d at 779.
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provide any such rights to title guaranty companies, the intent of the
legislature could be interpreted as forbidding title guaranty companies
from drafting such instruments. 36 No panacea has yet been discovered
to resolve the conflicting interests of the legal profession and the layman in activities which lie in the penumbra of both fields; but it is
suggested that the solution should be sought by informing the public
that independent legal advice from a duly qualified lawyer is essential
in any legal transaction rather than by inviting them to rely on unlicensed corporations who may as of now practice law in Tennessee.

STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION-INVALID ASSESSMENTSJUDICIAL REVIEW AFTER FAILURE TO EXHAUST

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Plaintiff owned subdivision lots which, prior to any construction in
the area, had been assessed at values ranging from $150 to $400. In
preparing the 1956 tax rolls, the assessing officer failed to consider that
certain of plaintiff's lots remained vacant and gave them the improved-lot valuation of $5500. The tax became due in July, 1956;
plaintiff took no action until April, 1957, at which time he attempted
to pay the tax under protest. The county treasurer, on the basis of a
statute prohibiting payment of delinquent taxes under protest,' refused to accept payment so tendered, but did accept an unconditional
payment. It was conceded that the plaintiff did not appear before the
board of review to contest the assessment but filed this action in
equity for a declaration that its previous payment of the assessment
be considered as made under protest and that it be declared "excessive, invalid, and illegal."'2 The taxpayer was denied relief in the
lower court. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan, held, reversed. Where a mistake of an assessor is of such significance that it
constitutes constructive fraud, equity has power to grant a taxpayer
relief even though he has not exhausted the administrative remedy
provided. Spoon-Shacket Co. v. County of Oakland, 356 Mich. 151, 97
N.W.2d 25 (1959).
States are not required, as a matter of due process of law, to afford
judicial review of the actions of tax assessors; 3 however, administrative review, consisting of reasonable notice and an opportunity to be
36. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS
213 (1934).
1. MICH.STAT. AnN.§ 7.102 (1950).

2. Plaintiff does not contest the sufficiency or validity of notice of assessment and the opportunity afforded for hearing on the assessment.
3. Hodge v. Muscatine County, 196 U.S. 276 (1905); Hagar v. Reclamation
Dist., 111 U.S. 701 (1884).
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heard, must be afforded at some point before the assessment becomes
final.4 Courts early began to encroach upon this administrative function by utilizing the common law writ of certiorari to review actions
in which an assessor acted beyond the scope of his authority or was
guilty of misconduct regardless of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.5 Subsequently, the courts assumed power to set aside assessors' actions on the fictional basis of constructive fraud where such
actions resulted in flagrant inequalities or over-assessments.6 This
additional judicial activity was taken advantage of by taxpayers
through suits in equity to enjoin illegal collections and actions of
assessors, defenses against suits to seize property or foreclose a tax
lien, and actions under statutes providing remedies for aggrieved
taxpayers. From these various remedies, three general approaches to
the role of judicial review in property taxation have evolved. The
most restricted approach is that of those courts which refuse to review
alleged assessment errors unless the assessing officer has proceeded
capriciously, arbitrarily and in wilful disregard of the law.7

Courts

adopting a broader concept of review powers often substitute their
judgment for that of the assessing officer in determining the value of
property.8 The intermediate view is that only errors of law are to be
reviewed and that actions of the administrative body will not be set
aside on the basis of mistakes of fact. 9 Equity has often assumed juris4. Ibid. In Michigan the Board of Review meets annually on the first and
second Tuesdays in March. "[Tlhey shall correct all errors in the names of
persons, in the descriptions of property, and in the assessment and valuation
of property thereon ....

."

MICH. STAT. ANN. § 7.29 (1950).

5. Hellerstein, JudicialReview of Property Tax Assessments, 14 TAx L. REV.
327 (1959); Stason, JudicialReview of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure to Resort
to Administrative Remedies, 28 MIcH. L. REv. 637 (1930).
6. Ibid.
7. For courts adopting similar restricted views, see Sparks v. McCluskey,
84 Ariz. 283, 327 P.2d 295 (1958); McClelland v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal.
App. 2d 124, 180 P.2d 676 (1947); Citizens' Comm. for Fair Property Taxation
v. Warner, 127 Colo. 121, 254 P.2d 1005 (1953); Appeal of Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 74 Idaho 39, 256 P.2d 526 (1953); People ex rel. Callahan v. Gulf, Mobile
& Ohio R.R. Co., 8 Ill.2d 66, 132 N.E.2d 544 (1956); Rogan v. County Comm'rs,
194 Md. 299, 71 A.2d 47 (1950); Naph-Sol Refining Co. v. Township of
Muskegon, 346 Mich. 16, 77 N.W.2d 255 (1956); May Dep't. Stores Co. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 308 S.W.2d 748 (Mo. 1958); State ex rel. Goza v. District Court,
125 Mont. 296, 234 P.2d 463 (1951); McCord v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. L.
Ry., 187 Tenn. 277, 213 S.W.2d 196 (1948); State v. Whittenberg, 153 Tex.
205, 265 S.W.2d 569 (1954); In re Assessment of Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 144
Wash. 469, 258 Pac. 473 (1927).
8. Some statutes, e.g., ALA. CODE AwN. tit. 51, § 140 (1940), authorize the
courts to "decide all questions both as to the legality of the assessment and
the amount thereof." For decisions adopting the broader view, see Monroe
Bond & Mortgage Co. v. State ex rel. Hybart, 254 Ala. 278, 48 So. 2d 431
(1950); Davis v. City of Clinton, 55 Iowa 549, 8 N.W. 423 (1881); People ex.
rel. Hotel Paramount Corp. v. Chambers, 298 N.Y. 372, 83 N.E.2d 839 (1949);
Traylor v. City of Allentown, 378 Pa. 489, 106 A.2d 577 (1954); In re Jepsen's
Appeal, 76 S.D. 421, 80 N.W.2d 76 (1956).
9. Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors, 334 Mass. 549, 137 N.E.2d 462 (1956); Oliver
Iron Mining Co. v. Comm'r of Taxation, 247 Minn. 6, 76 N.W.2d 107 (1956);
W. L. Harper Co. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 300, 118 N.E.2d 643 (1954); State ex
rel. Hein v. City of Barron, 3 Wis. 2d 127, 87 N.W.2d 785 (1958).
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diction where grave inequities arise out of excessive assessments but
will not entertain suits where there is an adequate remedy at law.' 0
An adequate remedy at law is said to exist if there is appeal to the
courts, a statutory action, or a defense to an action to collect the tax.
In states that have provided remedies for aggrieved taxpayers, it is
generally held that failure to exhaust one's administrative remedies
precludes judicial review 12 unless the tax is void.13
The instant case arose in a jurisdiction which provided review of
assessment errors by a board 14 and which had a statute that permitted
a taxpayer to pay a non-delinquent tax under protest and sue for
recovery within thirty days of payment if the tax was found illegal. 15
The court here was called upon to decide whether or not an overassessed taxpayer, who had not paid the tax under protest nor proceeded under the administrative or statutory remedy, could be granted
relief in equity. It is conceded by the court that in the "ordinary case
of error of assessment of property taxes, the remedy provided by hearing before the board of review is final and exclusive."'1 6 The court
holds, however, that where the mistake is of such significance that it
constitutes constructive fraud, equity's door is open to the innocent
though careless victim. The court construes this holding as not affording an additional or alternative remedy but designates it as the
"known remedy" provided by equity in favor of those actually or constructively defrauded. The dissent recognized the line of Michigan
10. Lackey v. Pulaski Drainage Dist., 4 Ill.2d 72, 122 N.E.2d 257 (1954). See
4 COOLEY, TAxArioN § 1646 (4th ed. 1924) for compilation of cases.
11. Narehood v. Pearson, 374 Pa. 299, 96 A.2d 895, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 866
(1953); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Garner, 193 Tenn. 91, 241 S.W.2d 926, appeal
dismissed, 342 U.S. 900, rehearingdenied, 342 U.S. 934 (1951); Todd v. County
of Elizabeth City, 191 Va. 52, 60 S.E.2d 23 (1950). See 4 COOLEY, TAXATION
§ 1647 (4th ed. 1924) for discussion and additional cases.
12. Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 265 (1924); Security-

First Nat'l Bank v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal.2d 319, 217 P.2d 946, cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950); Weidenhaft v. Board of County Comm'rs, 131
Colo. 432, 283 P.2d 164 (1955); In re Felton's Petition, 79 Idaho 325, 316 P.2d
1064 (1957); Burley v. Lindheimer, 367 Ill. 425, 11 N.E.2d 926 (1937); County
Board of Review v. Kranz, 224 Ind. 358, 66 N.E.2d 896 (1946); Security Trust

& Say. Bank v. Mitts, 220 Iowa 271, 261 N.W. 625 (1935); Blair v. Potter, 132
Mont. 176, 315 P.2d 177 (1957); Boettcher v. County of Holt, 163 Neb. 231, 79

N.W.2d 183 (1956); Lairmore v. Board of County Comm'rs, 200 Okla. 436,

195 P.2d 762 (1948).
13. Ogden City v. Armstrong, 168 U.S. 224 (1897); Graves v. McDonough,
264 Ala. 407, 88 So. 2d 371 (1956); Stafford v. Riverside County, 155 Cal. App.

2d 474, 318 P.2d 172 (1957); Jewett Realty Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 239
Iowa 988, 33 N.W.2d 377 (1948); Rapid Ry. Co. v. Schroeder, 190 Mich. 684,

157 N.W. 422 (1916); Ainsworth v. County of Fillmore, 166 Neb. 779, 90
N.W.2d 360 (1958); City of Houston v. Union City Transfer, 307 S.W.2d 645
(Tex. 1957). For a discussion of erroneous taxes classified as "void" but not
subject to collateral attack unless all administrative appeals have been taken
see Stason, note 5 supra at 652.
14. This statute required, however, that the tax be shown illegal for the
reasons given in the protest filed at the time of payment under protest. MciH.
STAT. ANN. § 7.29 (1950).
15. MAxcH. STAT. ANN. § 7.97 (1950).

16. 97 N.W.2d at 33.
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cases which applied the principle that unless a taxpayer has exhausted
his administrative remedy he is estopped to seek relief in the courts.
It is generally held that exhaustion of the administrative remedies is
not mandatory where the tax is classed as "void." A tax falls within
this class when the taxing authority lacks jurisdiction over the property taxed, where the property is exempt from taxation, or where
actual fraud exists.lV It does not appear that the tax levied in this
case falls into any of these groups of tax errors which render a tax
void since the court labels this mistake as only "constructive fraud." 18
Adoption of the broad concept of review undoubtedly gives greater
protection to the individual, unsuspecting taxpayer who is the victim
of an administrative or clerical error or mistake of fact. This view is
criticized on the grounds that it tends to increase litigation thereby
slowing down the entire judicial machinery and that it subjects the
financial structure of the local tax unit to continuous alteration. 19 The
advocates of the restricted view contend that administrative functions
delegated by the legislature should be subject only to limited review,
that is, review of improprieties in procedure or violations of substantive rules of law. This approach is supported by reasoning that such
review insures prompt complaint by taxpayers who are aggrieved
and relieves courts of the burden of passing on trivial errors that could
be disposed of in administrative proceedings. 20 As pointed out by an
eminent writer in the field,2 1 the nature and scope of judicial review
must depend upon the character of administrative review afforded. If
competent, impartial, and independent persons administer this function, then it becomes difficult to justify judicial review for matters
other than problems of law, errors of method and impropriety of
procedure. However, the administrative machinery of most states
does not measure up to this degree of independence or impartiality.
17. Stason, note 5 supra at 651.
18. This holding brings Michigan into the camp of states following the
broad concept of judicial review and gives plaintiff the benefit of a statute
passed after this action was commenced which provides: "Any taxpayer who
is assessed and pays taxes in excess of the correct and lawful amount due
because of a clerical error or mutual mistake of fact made by the assessing
officer and the taxpayer may recover the excess so paid, without interest, if
suit is commenced within 3 years from the date of payment, notwithstanding
that the payment was not made under protest." MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 7.97(1)
(1958).
19. Stason, note 5 supra at 662.
20. Hartman, State and Local Taxation-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND.
L. Rv. 1335 (1959).
21. Hellerstein, note 5 supra at 349.
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TAXATION-INCOME-INCLUSION IN GROSS INCOME OF
FUNDS RECEIVED FOR A RESEARCH PROJECT
AT A UNIVERSITY
Respondent determined a deficiency in the income tax of petitioner
for the taxable year 1954. Petitioner, the holder of a doctorate, was on
the faculty of Vanderbilt University. 1 Under the terms of his employment he devoted one-fourth of his time to teaching and three-fourths
to participation in a project of economic research.2 The funds for this
project were granted to Vanderbilt by the Rockefeller Foundation. 3 Of
petitioner's salary for the tax year in issue, one-fourth was paid from
general University funds; the remainder came from funds given Vanderbilt University by the Rockefeller Foundation for the direction of
this research. Petitioner contended that three-fourths of the amount
he received at Vanderbilt during that year 4 was excludable from gross
income as a fellowship grant under section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 5 The Commissioner treated the entire amount as
1. "Vanderbilt University is an educational institution within the meaning

of section 151(e) (4) of the 1954 Code, and an organization described by
section 501(c) (3), and exempt from tax under the provision of subsection
(a) of that section." 32 T.C. No. 103, 3096 (1959).
2. The Rockefeller Foundation made a grant to Vanderbilt University to
be used for a specific research project in economics. A senior professor in the
Vanderbilt Department of Economics directed the taxpayer's project.
3. "The Rockefeller Foundation is an organization qualifying under section
401(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and exempt from tax under
subsection (a) of that section." 32 T.C. No. 103, 3096 (1959).
4. Taxpayer's employment at Vanderbilt began September 1, 1954.
5. The statute reads:
"SEC. 117. SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIP GRANTS.
(a) General Rule.-In the case of an individual, gross income does not
include(1) any amount received(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined in section
151(e) (4)), or
(B) as a fellowship grant, including the value of contributed services
and accommodations; and
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for(A) travel,
(B) research,
(C) clerical help, or
(D) equipment,
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but only
to the extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.
(b) Limitations.(1) Individuals who are candidates for degrees.-In'the case of an individual who is a candidate for a degree at an educational institution (as
defined in section 151(e) (4)), subsection (a) shall not apply to that portion of any amount received which represents payment for teaching, research, or other services in the nature of part-time employment required
as a condition to receiving the scholarship or the fellowship grant. If
teaching, research, or other services are required of all candidates
(whether or not recipients of scholarships or fellowship grants) for a
particular degree as a condition to receiving such degree, such teaching,
research, or other services shall not be regarded as part-time employment
within the meaning of this paragraph.
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taxable income. After exhausting his administrative remedies, the
taxpayer,6 refusing to pay the alleged deficiency, filed a petition in the
Tax Court of the United States contesting the assessment. Held, for
the Commissioner. Where payments to an individual, not a candidate
for a degree, are made primarily for carrying out a research project
undertaken by a university and directed by one of its departments,
the payments are not excludable from gross income as a fellowship
grant under section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Frank
Thomas Bachmura, 32 T. C. No. 103 (Aug. 24, 1959).
Prior to 1954 there was no separate provision in the Internal Revenue Code concerning fellowship grants; they were excludable from
gross income only if they could be considered gifts.7 In George W.
Stone, Jr..8 the Tax Court held that a fellowship granted to a professor
of English literature to enable him to devote his full time to a research
project, on which he had been working in his spare time, was nontaxable. The court stated that since the grant was to facilitate the
further education or training of the recipient, since the work was his
own and not that of the grantor, and since he was not under the direction or control of the grantor, the amount received was a gift and
not payment for services.9 The Tax Court held fellowships taxable in
three other cases10 on the ground that the grants did not meet the
requirements of a gift. In each of those cases the recipient was ex(2) Individuals who are not candidates for degrees.-In the case of
an individual who is not a candidate for a degree at an educational institution (as defined in section 151 (e) (4) ),subsection (a) shall apply only
if the condition in subparagraph (A) is satisfied and then only within the
limitations provided in subparagraph (B).
(A) Conditions for exclusion.-The grantor of the scholarship or
fellowship grant is an organization described in section 501(c) (3)
which is exempt from tax under section 501(a), the United States, or an
instrumentality or agency thereof, or a State, a Territory, or a possession
of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District
of Columbia.
(B) Extent of exclusion.-The amount of the scholarship or fellowship
grant excluded under subsection (a) (1) in any taxable year shall be limited to an amount equal to $300 times the number of months for which
the recipient received amounts under the scholarship or fellowship grant
during such taxable year, except that no exclusion shall be allowed under
subsection (a) after the recipient has been entitled to exclude under this
section for a period of 36 months (whether or not consecutive) amounts
received as a scholarship or fellowship grant while not a candidate for a
degree at an educational institution (as defined in section 151 (3) (4))."
INT. REv. CODE OF

1954, § 117.

6. Dr. Bachmura appeared pro se in the Tax Court proceedings.

7.

INT. REv. CODE OF

1939, § 22(b) (3). It has been stated that to establish a

gift, "there must be an intention to make a gift, a transfer of possession in
accordance therewith, and an acceptance by the donee." Also there could be
no consideration or compensation for the transfer. Robert E. Binger, 22 B.T.A.
111, 113 (1943).
8. 23 T.C. 254 (1954).
9. Id. at 262-63.
10. Ti Li Loo, 22 T.C. 220 (1954); Ephraim Banks, 17 T.C. 1386 (1952);
Robert F. Doerge, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 475 (1952).
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pected to use his skill in research on some particular project designated by the grantor, thereby, it was held, returning consideration
for the grant. In 1951 the Bureau of Internal Revenue took the position that fellowship grants were non-taxable if "made for the training
and education of an individual, either as part of his program in acquiring a degree or in otherwise furthering his educational development,
no services being rendered as consideration therefor. . . ."I In the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 117 was enacted to provide a
statutory basis for determining the tax status of fellowship and scholarship grants.12 Under this section in order for a grant to be excludable from the gross income of an individual, not a candidate for a
degree, it must be a fellowship grant and it must be received from a
tax exempt organization. 13 The statute also limits the amount of the
exclusion to $300 a month for a period not exceeding thirty-six
14
months.
The decision in the instant case is the first judicial interpretation
of section 117 since its enactment in 1954. Here the taxpayer claimed
he was the recipient of a fellowship grant from a tax exempt grantor,
had otherwise met the requirements of section 117 (b) (2),15 and was
thus entitled to the exclusion. He contended that in denying the
exclusion the Commissioner contravened the intent of Congress in
enacting section 117 by relying on the pre-1954 criterion of gift. 16
The taxpayer further argued that although section 117 (b) (1),17 relating to individuals who are candidates for degrees, states that where
certain services are required as a condition to the grant, the compensation will not be excludable from gross income, there is no comparable provision in section 117 (b) (2),18 relating to individuals who are
not candidates for degrees, and that therefore fellowship grants are
excludable even though they represent compensation for services. The
Commissioner, on the other hand, contended that the compensation received by the taxpayer could not be considered a fellowship grant
11. I. T. 4056, 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 8,
held four post-doctorate fellowships
pleted their educational development
skills was deemed to be consideration
12. See note 5 supra.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.

10. In the same opinion the Department
taxable because the recipients had comand the use of their previously acquired
for the grants.

15. Ibid.

16. Senate and House Committee reports indicate that § 117 was enacted
to eliminate the confusion which existed in the 1939 Code as to whether scholarship and fellowship grants were to be treated as income. There is no indication, however, that Congress intended to abolish the requirement that to be
excludable these grants must qualify as gifts. S. REP. No. 1662, 83d Cong. 2d
Sess. 188 (1954).
17. See note 5 supra.
18. See note 5 supra.
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under the applicable Treasury Regulation'9 and that these Regulations
are entirely consistent with section 117. The Commissioner urged that
the arrangement between the taxpayer and Vanderbilt University was
primarily one of employment and therefore was taxable 2 as a pay19. The applicable Regulation states:
"§ 1.117-2 Limitations.- (a) Individuals who are candidatesfor degrees.(1) In general-Under the limitations provided by section 117(b) (1) in
the case of an individual who is a candidate for a degree at an educational
institution, the exclusion from gross income shall not apply (except as
otherwise provided in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph) to that portion
of any amount received as payment for teaching, research, or other services in the nature of part-time employment required as a condition to
receiving the scholarship or fellowship grant. Payments for such parttime employment shall be included in the gross income of the recipient in
an amount determined by reference to the rate of compensation ordinarily
paid for similar services performed by an individual who is not the
recipient of a scholarship or a fellowship grant. A typical example of
employment under this subparagraph is the case of an individual who is
required as a condition to receiving the scholarship or the fellowship
grant, to perform part-time teaching services. A requirement that the
individual shall furnish periodic reports to the grantor of the scholarship
or the fellowship grant for the purpose of keeping the grantor informed
as to the general progress of the individual shall not be deemed to constitute the performance of services in the nature of part-time employment.
(2) Exception.-If teaching, research, or other services are required of
all candidates (whether or not recipients of scholarships or fellowship
grants) for a particular degree as a condition to receiving the degree,
such teaching, research, or other services on the part of the recipient of
a scholarship or fellowship grant who is a candidate for such degree shall
not be regarded as part-time employment within the meaning of this
paragraph. Thus, if all candidates for a particular education degree are
required, as part of their regular course of study or curriculum, to perform part-time practice teaching services, such services are not to be
regarded as part-time employment within the meaning of this paragraph.
* "§; 1.117-4. Items Not Considered as Scholarships of Fellowship Grants.
-The following payments or allowances shall not be considered to be
amounts received as a scholarship or a fellowship grant for the purpose
of section 117:
"" "(c) Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily for the
benefit of the grantor.
(1) Except as provided in § 1.117-2(a), any amount paid or allowed
to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studies or research, if such amount represents either compensation for past, present,
or future employment services or represents payment for services which
are subject to the direction or supervision of the grantor.
(2) Any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to
enable him to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the
grantor. However, amounts paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studies or research are considered to be
amounts received as a scholarship or fellowship grant for the purpose of
section 117 if the primary purpose of the studies or research is to further
the education and training of the recipient in his individual capacity and
the amount provided by the grantor for such purpose does not represent
compensation or payment for the services described in subparagraph (1)
of this paragraph. Neither the fact that the recipient is required to furnish
reports of his progress to the grantor, nor the fact that the results of his
studies or research may be of some incidental benefit to the grantor shall,
of itself, be considered to destroy the essential character of such amount
as a scholarship or fellowship grant." Treas. Reg. § 1.117 (1956).
20. See note 19 supra.
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ment representing compensation for "employment services" under
Regulation section 1.117-4 (c). The court, in adopting the views of the
Commissioner, held the Regulations valid since the taxpayer had not
shown that they were unreasonable and inconsistent with the statute.2 1
In deciding whether a grant to an individual, not a candidate for a
degree, is entitled to the section 117 exclusion it is necessary to determine the manner in which the grant was made. The methods by
which a foundation interested in education makes funds for research
available may vary somewhat as follows:
1. Grants may be made to a university upon application by it
for the purpose of undertaking a research project which the university defines. Such a project will normally be under the supervision
of some university administrator and the university will employ
personnel to work under him.
2. Grants may be made directly to an individual scholar upon his
application with the foundation defining the research project and
supervising the work of the recipient.
3. Grants may be made to a university upon application by it. The
university then may make grants from the fund to an individual
scholar upon his application with the scholar choosing his own research project and working unsupervised.
4. Grants may be made directly to an individual scholar upon his
application with the scholar choosing his own research project and
working unsupervised.
The method by which the grant in the instant case was made is identical to that shown in example 1, above. The decision in this case
states that such a grant will not be excludable under section 117. The
decision also indicates that a grant such as that in example 2, above,
will not be excludable by the individual recipient. The court considers
such grants as compensation for "employment services"' 2 and nonexcludable since the research project is defined by either the foundation or the university and the individual's efforts are supervised by
them. On the other hand the court recognizes that if the grant is
made primarily to encourage individual scholars to pursue research
on their own initiative the amount of the grant will be excludable.
This is true even though the funds are used by the recipient to take
the place of his teaching salary for a period of time. It would therefore seem that if the grant is made in the manner shown in either
21. The court states that statutory grants of special tax exemption are to be

strictly construed and that the Regulation will be considered valid unless

unreasonable and inconsistent with the statute. 32 T.C. No. 103 (Aug. 24,
1959).

22. 32 T.C. No. 103.
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example 3 or 4, above, the individual recipient will be entitled to the
section 117 exclusion. In such cases it is questionable whether the
grant to the scholar can be said to be "compensation" as argued by
petitioner in the instant case and to which the Tax Court agreed.2
But in any event it will be treated differently from compensation for
"employment services."

TORTS-LIBEL AND SLANDER-ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
OF EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
FROM DEFAMATION SUITS
Defendant, Acting Director' of Rent Stabilization, 2 issued a press
release announcing his intention of suspending certain employees for
activities which had resulted in severe criticism of the agency by
Congress and the press. 3 Plaintiff-employees brought suit against de4
fendant charging that the press release had libeled them. Defendant
23. 32 T.C. No. 103.
1. Defendant's official title at the time of the press release was Deputy Director of Rent Stabilization. However, he had been appointed Acting Director
to become effective four days later and was "acting" in the position of the
director by virtue of the retiring director being out of town. 360 U.S. at 583,
n. 10.

2. The office of Rent Stabilization was a branch of the Economic Stabilization Agency, whose head was the Director of Economic Stabilization. Barr v.
Matteo, 244 F.2d 767, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The Director of Economic Stabilization was appointed by the President and was directly responsible to him in
policy matters, so his position might be comparable to that of a cabinet member for purposes of determining immunity from civil suit. 360 U.S. at 583.
However, even if we assume defendant to be the head of Rent Stabilization,
it can easily be seen that he was below the rank of a cabinet member.
3. In 1950, the plaintiffs were executives in the Office of House Expediter,
the predecessor agency of the Office of Rent Stabilization, and defendant was
it's general manager. The statutory existence of the office was about to
expire, and it was questionable whether Congress would extend it. However,
there was a large sum of money available to the agency earmarked for terminal-leave payments of employees for that year. Plaintiffs presented a plan
calculated to utilize those funds by discharging employees, paying their
accrued terminal-leaves from the fund, rehiring them immediately as temporary employees and restoring them to permanent status when and if the
life of the agency was extended. The purpose of the plan was to prevent the
agency from having to make these terminal-leave payments out of its general
funds when the employees were actually terminated if the life of the agency
was extended. Defendant opposed the plan because he felt it was wrong in
spirit, though technically legal, but was not in a position to keep it from
being used in connection with about fifty employees. In 1953 a senator sent a
letter to the Office of Rent Stabilization inquiring about the plan. Plaintiffs,
who were also executives in the successor agency, made no effort to present
the letter to defendant, but drafted a reply defending the plan in a manner
which definitely gave the impression that defendant was in full accord with
it. Criticism of the agency from the Senate and the press followed. Defendant
served notice upon plaintiffs that they were to be suspended from office and
ordered the issuance of a press release which contained an account of the
controversy and his action. 360 U.S. at 565-67.
4. The suit was brought in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia.
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contended the issuance of the press release was within his official duty
and therefore protected by a qualified or absolute immunity. The jury
found defendant's statement libelous and the-federal district court
entered judgment for the plaintiffs, overruling defendant's contention
that an immunity existed. The court of appeals held that the defendant was entitled only to a qualified immunity.5 On certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed. A government
official is absolutely immune from liability for defamatory statements
made within the scope of his duty. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
The privileges or immunities6 of public officials in defamation
suits have been largely developed by the judiciary. 7 It has long been
recognized in Anglo-American law that legislative8 and judicial9
officers are protected by an absolute immunity for statements made
in their official capacity.1° However, the absolute immunity of executive officers has developed more slowly." In the latter part of the
12
nineteenth century, the English courts held that military officers
3
and high ranking cabinet members' were absolutely immune from
liability for statements made in interdepartmental communications.
In 1896, in Spalding v. Vilas,'4 the Supreme Court of the United States,
relying upon the English cases and extending those principles, held
that cabinet members were absolutely immune from liability for corn5. Barr v. Matteo, 256 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

6. "Privilege" and "immunity" are used interchangeably by the Court. How-

ever, since "privilege" carries with it the connotation that there is a class of

people which the law gives a special treatment, "immunity" seems to be the
more accurate term. See PRossER, TORTS 607, n. 1 (2d ed. 1955); Veeder,
Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLum. L. REv.
463, 469 (1909).

7. 360 U.S. at 569; Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLuTm. L. REv. 463, 471 (1909).

8. The history of legislative immunity in England is largely the history of
the struggle between parliament and the crown for supremacy. It was first
recognized as a custom of parliament in the fourteenth century, but during
the Tudor and Stuart reigns (1485-1688) the extent of the immunity was
uncertain. Parliament finally established its supremacy in 1689 and absolute
immunity was guaranteed to its proceedings by the Bill of Rights. See Veeder,
Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceedings,
10 CoLm. L. Rsv. 131, 132 (1910).
9. The absolute privilege of judicial officers seems to have been a product
of the judiciary's struggle for independence in England. See Spalding v.
Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 495 (1896); Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation:
Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLum L. R-v. 463, 474 (1909); Defamation-Absolute
Immunity, 15 OHIo ST. L.J. 330, 337 (1954).
10. The main difference between qualified and absolute immunity is that
with a qualified immunity, there will be recovery if actual malice (as distinguished from malice implied-by-law where there is no immunity) is
alleged and proven, while if there exists an absolute immunity no inquiry
into malice will be allowed even though it is alleged. PRossER, TORTS 507 (2d
ed. 1955).
11. Comment, Defamation Immunity for Executive Officers, 20 U. Cur. L.
REv. 677, 678 (1953).
12. Dawkins v. Paulet, L.R. 5 Q.B. 94 (1869).
13. Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India, [1895] 2 Q.B. 189.
14. 161 U.S. 483.
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'munication to foriver employees of the cabinet member's depart-ment.15 While the Supreme Court has had no occasion to extend the
.Spalding doctrine, the lower federal courts have broadened the immunity of cabinet officers to include press releases16 and have extended the absolute immunity for interdepartmental communications
to lower officials.' 7 Statements which lower officials are required to
:make to fulfill affirmative duties have likewise been afforded absolute
immunity.18 In some states absolute immunity has been extended to
.lower state officials' 9 while others have granted only a qualified
20
immunity to officials below the rank of a state cabinet member.
In the instant case the Court was presented with two problems:
was the press release made by defendant within the scope of his official duty, and, if within the scope of his duty, should it be protected
'by an absolute or a qualified immunity.21 Eight members of the Court
22
found that the press release was within the scope of defendant's duty
on the theory that the press release was at least "an appropriate
exercise of the [defendant's] discretion ' '23 and the fact that issuing
15. Since the communications in Spalding were made only to former employees of the postal department -who had a direct interest in the subject
matter, its holding might well have been limited to interdepartmental comnunications. However, the courts have never chosen to so limit it. Glass v.
.Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941) (press
release by Secretary of Interior); Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.
1921), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 530 (1927) (press release by Secretary of the
Treasury).
16. Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
718 (1941); Mellon -v. Brewer, 18 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275
'U.S. 530 (1927).
17. Taylor v. Glotfelty, 201 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1952) (psychiatrist of medical
center for Federal prisoners); Farr v. Valentine, 38 App. D.C. 413 (Ct. App.
1912) (commissioner of Indian Affairs); De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.
D.C. 167 (Ct. App. 1904), appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 616 (1904) (chief of
record and pension office of War Department); Carson v. Behlen, 136 F. Supp.
222 (R.I. 1955) (chief of dietetic service of veterans' hospital); Miles v. McGrath, 4 F. Supp. 603 (Md. 1933) (naval officer).
18. Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (United States
Consul required by law to make report).
19. Catron v. Jasper, Z303 Ky. 598, 198 S.W.2d 323 (1946) (county sheriff);
Schlinkert v. Henderson, 331 Mich. 284, 49 N.W.2d 180 (1955) (member of
state liquor control commission); Hughes v. Bizzell, 189 Okla. 472, 117 P.2d
763 (1941) (president of state university); Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 'Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958) (deputy commissioner of Public
Property of Philadelphia and city architect of Philadelphia).
20. Mills v. Denny, 245 Iowa 584, 63 N.W.2d 222 (1954) (mayor of Des
Moines); Peeples v. State, 179 Misc. 272, 38 N.Y.S.2d 690 (C.C.N.Y. 1943)
(state examiner).
21. In a companion case, Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959), the Court,
by a six-to-three majority, held that defendant, a captain in the United
States Navy and Commander of the Boston Naval Shipyard, was absolutely
immune for an alleged defamatory report sent to members of the Massachusetts congressional delegation.
22. 360 U.S. at 564 (majority opinion by Harlan, J.), 576 (concurring
opinion by Black, J.), 578 (dissenting opinion by Warren, C.J.), 586 (dissenting opinion by Brennan, J.).
23. 360 U.S. at 575.
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press releases was standard agency practice. 24 Mr. Justice-Stewart
thought the issuance of the press release was unrelated to defendant's
official duty because it was for the sole purpose of defending his own
individual ieputation.2
Six justices were of the opinion that defendant's duties entitled him
to an absolute immunity26 while the other three justices felt that only
a qualified immunity was justified. 27 Mr. Justice Harlan, writing an
opinion adopted by three other justices, concluded that the desirability
of compensating the defamed plaintiffs for injuries to their reputation
was outweighed by the public interest in having executive officers
discharge their duties without fear of defamation suits.2 Mr. Justice
Stewart2 and Mr. Justice Black accepted this rationale, but Mr. Justice Black thought more emphasis should be placed upon the necessity
that government officials be able to freely comment upon the activities
of other government officials in order to create a better informed public opinion. 30 In a dissenting opinion adopted by Mr. Justice Douglas,
Mr. Chief Justice Warren contended that the need to allow private
citizens to criticize actions of government officials without fear of
completely protected retorts, and in addition the desirability of allowing defamed plaintiffs redress, outweighed the danger of compelling
government officials below the rank of cabinet members to occasionally defend their motives in defamation suits.31 Mr. Justice Brennan
argued in a separate dissent that even if the Court's balancing process
was the correct method to be applied, the determination should be
left to Congress because it was better equipped to handle the "impon32
derables" involved and to consider possible alternatives.
The result of the instant case seems to be that liability for defamation cannot be predicated on any statement, no matter how malicious,
made by any government official acting within the discretion afforded
by his position.P The major objection to this holding is that its basic
premise is conjectural: the extent to which fear of vexatious litigation
interferes with the effective functioning of government officials has
24. Id. at 574.
25. 360 U.S. at 592 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
26. 360 U.S. at 564 (majority opinion of Harlan, J.), 576 (dissenting
opinion by Stewart, J.).
27. 360 U.S. at 578 (dissenting opinion by Warren, C.J.), 586 (dissenting
opinion by Brennan, J.).
28. 360 U.S. at 571.
29. 360 U.S. at 592 .(Stewart, J., dissenting).
30. 360 U.S. at 577 (Black, J., dissenting).
31. 360 U.S. at B84 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 1IAr. Chief, Justice Warren
would apparently distinguish between those officials who are appointed
directly by the President and those who are not on the basis of the first
group partaking of presidential immunity. See 360 U.S. at 582-8.3 (Warren,
C.J., dissenting)-.
32. 360 U.S. 591 (Brennan, .,dissenting).
33. 360 U.S. at 573. See also 360 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
protection given to higher officials is broader than that given to lessor officials
only because the discretion of the higher official is- broader. 360 U.S, at 573.
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never been determined. Beyond the assumptions made by the courts
and writers on the subject there appear to be no conclusive data. Such
an important right of citizens-the right to be secure from malicious
injury to their reputations-should not be withdrawn without a concrete demonstration of its harmful consequences. In the absence of
such a showing, and in view of some recent evidence, referred to by
Mr. Justice Brennan, indicating that an absolute immunity may be
abused,34 perhaps the extension of the immunity is unwarranted.
Should evidence appear indicating that the qualified privilege is insufficient to give the needed protection to government officials, Congress in any event will be better able to provide the solution than the
courts.35 Until such evidence appears it seems that the qualified privilege, which protects the official against all but malicious conduct, is
more desirable. Furthermore, even if it is true that government officials are actually restrained in the performance of their duties by
fear of defamation suits to an extent which warrants the denial of
redress to plaintiffs who have been defamed, this result is still open
to question. Under prior Supreme Court decisions, the existence of
the immunity was determined by a reasonably specific test-the official's status in the executive hierarchy. It is now to be granted on a
functional basis to any official making statements within the proper
discretion afforded by his position. Whatever the theoretical merits
of a functional test, it remains that in this context any uncertainty
about the existence of the privilege in a given case (was the statement
made within the proper discretion of the official?) renders doubtful
the value of the immunity as an incentive to fearless executive
action.6

TORTS-WRONGFUL DEATH-LIABILITY OF CONVERTER OF
CHATTEL WHICH RESULTS IN OWNER'S SUICIDE
Plaintiff's testator, a diamond broker, took possession of a diamond
with the understanding that the stone or its stated value was to be
surrendered upon demand. He consigned the diamond on the same
terms to the defendants, diamond dealers, in order that they might
find a prospective purchaser. Defendants, knowing such consignments
34. 360 U.S. at 590 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. 360 U.S. at 590 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a good article proposing
that the government should be held liable for the malicious torts of its
officials, see Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 MCH. L. REv.
201 (1956). Another possible solution to the problem is for Congress to
modify our federal summary judgment procedure so as to allow the court
to determine the issue of malice on the basis of the pleadings, depositions,
discovery and affidavits. Comment, Absolute Immunity: Too Broad a Protection for the "Public Interest"? 10 STrA. L. REV. 589, 594 (1958).
36. 360 U.S. at 576 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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were customary in the diamond trade, intentionally converted the
jewel. The complaint alleged defendants intended thus to injure deceased's business reputation, and that their wrongful act caused the
decedent such extreme emotional distress that he committed suicide.
On motion to dismiss plaintiff's action for wrongful death on the
ground that it failed to state a cause of action, heZd, for plaintiff. An
allegation that defendants' intentional and malicious conversion provoked insanity in the deceased so that he took his own life states a
cause of action within the wrongful death statute.' Cauverien v.
DeMetz, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
Tort liability attaches only if a defendant's wrongful conduct was
the proximate cause 2 or a substantial factor 3 in bringing about the
harm of which plaintiff complains. But courts are more ready to
recognize a connecting link between the act of the defendant and the
harm complained of when the act is intentional, rather than negligent.4 Courts have allowed damages for mental anguish where it
1. "The executor or administrator . . . of a decedent who has left him or

her surviving a husband, wife, or next of kin, may maintain an action to
recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect or default, by which the decedent's death was caused, against a natural person who . ..would have been
liable to an action in favor of the decedent by reason thereof if death had
not ensued. Such an action must be commenced within two years after the
decedent's death." N.Y. Deced. Est. § 130.
2. Because there are innumerable causes in every case, the term "proximate
cause" includes two pertinent questions: first, was the defendant's conduct
a factual cause of the damage? and second, did this conduct play such an
appreciable part as to make him responsible?
(1927).
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See generally GREEN, PROXI-

3. "If the actor's conduct is intended by him to bring about bodily harm to

another which the actor is not privileged to inflict, it is the legal cause of any
bodily harm of the type intended by him which it is a substantial factor in
bringing about." RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 279 (1934). This rule is applicable
"to determine liability for conduct intended to invade other interests of
personality .... ." Id at § 280. See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 455 (1934).
4. "[Tjhe moral aspect of the case . . . not infrequently has directed the
course of the law. . . . Causation, as distinguished from duty, is purely a
matter of producing a subsequent event. In determining how far the law
will trace causation and afford a remedy, the facts as to the defendant's intent, his imputable knowledge, or his justifiable ignorance are often taken into
account. The moral element is here the factor that has turned close cases
one way or the other. For an intended injury the law is astute to discover
even very remote causation. For one which the defendant merely ought to
have anticipated it has often stopped at an earlier stage of the investigation
of causal connection. And as to those where there was neither knowledge
nor duty to foresee, it has usually limited accountability to direct and immediate results.
"This is not because the defendant's act was a more immediate cause in one
case than in the others, but because it has been felt to be just and reasonable
that liability should extend to results further removed when certain elements
of fault were present. Treating all these cases as turning upon an issue of
immediateness of causation has resulted in much confusion of ideas and made
the conflict of decision appear to be greater than it is.... The decisions do
not turn on remoteness of causation alone, but upon such remoteness plus
freedom from moral fault." Derosier v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 81
N.H. 456, 463-64, 130 Atl. 145, 152-53 (1925). See generally Bauer, The Degree
of Moral Fault as Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L.-Rav. 586 (1933).
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accompanies physical injury, and in recent years the intentional
infliction of emotional distress has become an independent ground
of recovery.5 While consequential damages awarded for conversion
have traditionally included the value of the property with interest,
there is no substantial reason why they should be limited6 so as to
exclude recovery for mental suffering,7 but there is little authority
supporting this proposition. Whether consequential damages for
mental suffering will encompass death by suicide has arisen in contexts other than conversion actions,8 and the consensus is that suicide
is a new and independent act for which the defendant is not civilly
responsible.9 But according to many dicta an action under the death
5. United States v. Hambleton, 185 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1950); Gadbury v.
Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134, 233 Pac. 299 (1925); Herman Saks & Sons v. Ivey, 26

Ala. App. 240, 157 So. 265 (1934). PROSSER, TORTS § 11 (2d ed. 1955). See note
11 infra.
6. McCoRmIcK, DAMAGES 466 (1935). It is not unusual for consequential

damages to include an award for loss of use during any period of detention.

See, e.g., Food Specialties, Inc. v. John C. Dowd, Inc., 162 N.E.2d 276 (Mass.
1959).
7. In Brian v. Wilson, 81 So. 2d 145 (La. 1955) a conditional vendor re-

possessed two trucks from plaintiff and sold them to a third person. Plaintiff

recovered $100 for humiliation and embarrassment. The persuasiveness of
this decision in a common law jurisdiction is questionable.
8. The cases in which civil recovery for suicide has been sought may be
roughly categorized as: (1) suits authorized by civil damage statutes for
death caused by use of intoxicating liquors (see Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 751, 765
(1950)); (2) claims under workmen's compensation statutes (see 1 LARSON,
WORKMN'S COlMPENSATION §§ 36.00 to .40 (1952)); (3) suicide following
intentional torts (see Bauer, Suicide as Intervening Cause in Case of Wilful
Torts, 5 ILL. L.Q. 239 (1923), Bauer, Suicide as Intervening Cause in Workmen's Compensation Cases as Compared with Suicide in Cases of Wrongful
Death, 5 B.U.L. REv. 229 (1925)); and (4) where decedent took his own life
after being harmed by defendant's negligence. Liability is predicated on
causal relationship in all of these situations, but the extent of liability differs.
9. Scheffer v. Railroad, 105 U.S. 249 (1882) (demurrer sustained in wrongful
death action where passenger committed suicide eight months after being
injured in a collision of two trains); Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed. 92 (2d Cir.
1921) (demurrer to complaint sustained where suicide followed physical and
mental torture); Stevens v. Steadman, 140 Ga. 680, 79 S.E. 564 (1913) (error
to overrule demurrer to complaint alleging a letter requesting resignation
caused suicide); Brown v. American Steel & Wire Co., 43 Ind. App. 560, 88
N.E. 80 (1909) (directed verdict on re-trial where, suicide followed physical
injury and employer negligent per se); Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray, 111 Ind.
App. 467, 39 N.E.2d 776 (1942) (drug store not liable where father sent eight
year old child to purchase poison he used to commit suicide); Daniels v. New
York, N.H. & H. R.R., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424, 426 (1903) (plaintiff did
not sustain his burden of proving that negligently inflicted physical injury
caused decedent's suicide); Long v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 108 Neb. 342, 187
N.W. 930 (1922) (demurrer sustained in a wrongful death action where complaint alleged defendant's negligently inflicted physical injury); Koch v. Fox,
71 App. Div. 288, 75 N.Y.S. 913 (1902) (evidence did not justify jury's verdict
that suicide resulted from an insane impulse caused by negligent infliction of
physical injury); Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, Inc., 212 S.C. 485, 48 S.E.2d
324 (1948), 2 VAND. L. REV. 330 (1949); Jones v. Stewart, 183 Tenn. 176, 191
S.W.2d 439 (1946) (demurrer to complaint alleging accusation of crime led
to suicide sustained). Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co., 159 Wash. 137, 292 Pac.
436 (1930) (evidence did not show that negligently inflicted physical injury
caused a frenzy or uncontrollable impulse during which decedent took his
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statute may be maintained when insanity caused by defendant's negligent act or omission prevents the decedent from realizing the nature
of his act or controlling his conduct. 10 In such a case the intervening
act is considered that of an irresponsible agent.
The intentional infliction of injury or damage may be a basis for
an action in tort even though the act is not within a traditional tort
category." The court in the instant case noted that "where the defendant's act is intentional, recovery has been allowed for emotional
distress and physical harm resulting therefrom even in the absence
of direct physical injury."' 2 Therefore the court reasoned that "special
damages should also be allowed for mental suffering resulting from
a malicious and wilful conversion.'
In deciding whether or not the
special damages should include compensation for death by suicide
the court elected to follow the minority opinion in Salsedo v. Palmer.14
The dissenting judge in that case argued that whether or not suicide
breaks the chain of causation is a question of fact to be decided by
the jury. If a complaint shows a state of facts which fairly implies
that death was the proximate result of defendants' acts a demurrer
15
should be overruled.
The decision in this case that the allegations of the complaint state
a cause of action is justified. Civil liability for death by suicide,has
been denied as a matter of law 6 in an effort to prevent undeserved
own life); But cf. Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 179 N.E. 633 (1932), 45
HARV. L. REv. 1261 (defendant convicted of murder where girl committed

suicide after attempted rape).
10. Elliott v. Stone Baking Co., 49 Ga. App. 515, 176 S.E. 112 (1934) seems
to be the only case deciding this point. But it is asserted by dicta in
these cases: Brown v. American Steel & Wire Co., 43 Ind. App. 560, 88 N.E.
80 (1909); Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray, 111 Ind. App. 467, 39 N.E.2d 776 (1942);
Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903); Long

v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 108 Neb. 342, 187 N.W. 930 (1922); Arsnow v. Red
Top Cab Co., 159 Wash. 137, 292 Pac. 436 (1930). See also Trumbaturi v.
Katz & Besthoff, 180 La. 915, 158 So. 16 (1934) (decision predicated on LA.
CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1953) ).
11. For treatment of this prima facie tort doctrine see generally Hale,
Prima Facie Torts, Combination and Non-Feasance, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 196
(1946); 21 ALBANY L. REv. 308 (1957); 20 BROOKLYN L. REV. 122 (1953-54);
8 BUFFALO L. REv. 305 (1959).

12. 188 N.Y.S.2d 627, 631 (1959).

13. Ibid.
14. 278 Fed. 92 (2d Cir. 1921). In construing the New York wrongful death
statute the court held that no civil liability results where a person is wrongfully imprisoned and tortured in consequence of which he becomes suicidally
despondent and mentally irresponsible for his own conduct and kills himself,
because suicidal mania is not a natural or reasonable result of physical and
mental torture.
15. Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed. 92, 99 (2d Cir. 1921) (dissenting opinion).
See also Koch v. Fox, 71 App. Div. 288, 75 N.Y.S. 913, 920-21 (1902) (dictum).
16. See Scheffer v. Railroad, 105 U.S. 249 (1882); Salsedo v. Palmer, 278
Fed. 92 (2d Cir. 1921); Stevens v. Steadman, 140 Ga. 680, 79 S.E. 564 (1913);
Long v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 108 Neb. 342, 187 N.W. 930 (1922); Brown v.
American Steel & Wire Co., 43 Ind. App. 560, 88 N.E. 80 (1909) (semble);
Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903)
(semble).
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recoveries.17 But the fear of opening the door to baseless claims is a
poor reason for denying recovery when suicide is the result of defendant's conduct. The probability of succeeding on a false claim diminishes to the extent that advances in medical science and knowledge
of mental illness make it possible to establish causal relationship.
Moreover, the court under this ruling still retains a degree of control
over the result. After careful scrutiny of the evidence, a verdict for
the defendant may yet be directed or granted notwithstanding a
jury's verdict. 18 Thus the facts of this case when fully before the court
may not warrant recovery, but the instant decision is to be commended for making possible a rational choice on this ultimate issue.
17. This is connoted in several of the opinions, see note 15 supra. It is most
apparent in Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed. 92, 98-99 (1921) and Arsnow v.
Red Top Cab Co., 159 Wash. 137, 292 Pac. 436, 444 (1930).
18. English cases have held that premeditated suicide under the impulse of
insanity does not break the chain of causation. See, e.g., Pigney v. Pointers
Transp. Serv., Ltd. [1957] 2 All E.R. 807, 75 S.A.L.J. 99 (1958) (defendants
negligently injured decedent who committed suicide eighteen months later);
cf. workmen's compensation cases: Marriott v. Maltby Main Colliery Co.
[1920] 37 T.L.R. 123 (A.C.); Withers v. London, B. & S.C. Ry. [1916] 2 K.B.
772; Grime v. Fletcher [1915] 1 K.B. 734.

